



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

December 10, 2002

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Mr. John Young
CRYPTOME
251 West 89th Street
Suite 6E
New York, New York 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

References:

- a. Your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of March 29, 2001, for records concerning various dossiers. Your request was received in this office on April 18, 2001.
- b. Our letter of April 20, 2001, informing you that we were unable to comply with the 20-day statutory time limit.

We have conducted checks of the automated Defense Clearance and Investigations Index and a search of the Investigative Records Repository to determine the existence of Army intelligence investigative records responsive to your request.

We have located records pertaining to your request on Poland Intelligence Services MO, ZF400226W. We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 12958. As a result of our review, information has been sanitized and 66 pages of records are denied in their entirety as the information is currently and properly classified SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.3(a)(2), 1.3(a)(3), 1.5(c) and 1.5(d) of EO 12958. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552(b)(1). It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release. On March 9, 1999, the President exempted the file series in which these records are maintained from the automatic declassification provisions of EO 12958, Section 3.4, pertaining to classified records more than 25 years old. The records are enclosed for your use. A brief explanation of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.3(a)(2) of EO 12958 provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.3(a)(3) of EO 12958 provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

Section 1.5(c) of EO 12958 provides that information pertaining to intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, and cryptologic information shall be considered for classification protection.

Section 1.5(d) of EO 12958 provides that information pertaining to foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources shall be considered for classification protection.

Since the release of the information deleted from the records would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individual concerned, this information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(6).

Information has been sanitized and 121 pages are denied in their entirety as disclosure of the information would reveal the identity of confidential sources. This information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(D) of the FOIA. It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release. The significant and legitimate governmental purpose to be served by withholding is that a viable and effective intelligence investigative capability is dependent upon protection of confidential sources.

This material has been sanitized to remove reference to sensitive investigative methodology. The sanitized information is exempt from the public disclosure provision of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(E). The protection of sensitive investigative techniques is necessary for the maintenance of a viable and effective intelligence investigative capability.

In summary, we have denied a total of 187 pages, because of one or more exemptions.

The withholding of the information described above is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Major General Keith B. Alexander, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You have the right to appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal, you should forward it to this office. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 60-day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts.

Coordination has been completed and we have been informed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that information has been sanitized pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3) of the FOIA. To aid you in identifying the CIA exempted information we have bracketed it in black.

The withholding of the information by the CIA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision to the Agency Release Panel within 45 days from the date of this letter. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the following: Ms. Kathryn I. Dyer, Information & Privacy Coordinator, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC 20505. Please explain the basis of your appeal. Cite CIA #F-1998-02508 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

During the processing of your request, information was disclosed which is under the purview of other government agencies. This office has no authority to release these records and they are being referred, along with your request, for appropriate action under the FOIA, and direct reply to you.

We are coordinating with other government agencies concerning the releasability of their information contained in the records. We will inform you as to the releasability of the information upon completion of our coordination.

Fees for processing this request are waived.

If you have any questions concerning this action, please feel free to contact Mrs. Querry at (301) 677-4060. Refer to case #842F-01.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Russell A. Nichols". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Russell" being more prominent.

Russell A. Nichols
Chief, Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Enclosure

THIS MUST REMAIN TOP DOCUMENT

DOSSIER NO. ZF40 0226

As of 17 MAY 79 all material
(Date)

included in this file conforms with

DA policies currently in effect.

Christine Laxton 17 may 79
(Signature) (Date Signed)

Christine LAXTON 5
(Printed Name) (Grade)

REVIEWED BY M. McKeown 25/6/82
UP AR 381-4
REVIEWED BY ADJUTANT
DATE 05 1986

0001

THIS MUST REMAIN TOP DOCUMENT

MIA
HC Form 315
1 Sep 72 Sub. 75

Single
15/06/96

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- ☐ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

- ☒ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S) NO DUPLICATION FEE FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 2-3

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Page(s) 4-20

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Page(s) 21-24

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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DELETED PAGE(S) NO DUPLICATION FEE FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 27-54

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 27 MAR 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, CE Section EE-567324/d

RWB/ma

SUBJECT

Polish Intelligence Service

Re: Modus Operandi (S)(U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Operation of Polish Intelligence:

a. Source reported that the UB section of the Miliz (Polish State Militia) has taken over the operations of the UBP (Urząd Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego - State Secret Police), which was officially dissolved by the GOMULKA government in October 1956.

b. This Miliz UB section collects information on "political unreliaables", but does not arrest suspects as frequently as the old UBP. However, when a sufficient list of offenses is collected, a suspect is picked up and interrogated. Brutality by agents has decreased since 1956, Source asserted.

5 USC 552a (b) (1) c. The Miliz UB section utilizes secret informants and cover houses in its counter-espionage work, according to Source.

d. The WSW (Wywiad Spraw Wojskowa - Army Counter-Intelligence Service) utilizes soldiers in the various units assigned it for CI and CE coverage as informants.

(F-6)

2. Region VIII file examination: Negative on the two Miliz UB agents mentioned above. Frequent reports on PIS modus operandi have been submitted to your headquarters, subject and file as above.

0055

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WD AGO FORM 568
1 JUN 47

Incl 2

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Secret~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS REGION X
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 171 US FORCES

AEUC-SCCE (FIS)
XE-320529

4 February 1959

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]
re: Polish Identification System (U)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Forces
ATTN: AEUC-SCCE

1. (U) REFERENCE: Paragraph 5c(3)(b), Operational Memorandum
6/57, dated 20 June 1957.

2. (S) ~~(U)~~ FORWARDED:

a. [REDACTED]

3. (S) ~~(U)~~ CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source is [REDACTED]

who is evaluated

b. [REDACTED]

4. (S) ~~(U)~~ REMARKS:

a. [REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

MC 560

✓
REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL
ON JUN 17 1998
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

0056

Page 1 of 2 pages
Copy 1 of 3 copies

K 5031

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AEUC-SCCE (PIS)

4 February 1959

XE-320529

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

re: Polish Identification System (U)

[REDACTED]

b. Request an opinion of the value of attached material and desirability of obtaining similar material in future.

c. No further action contemplated by this office.

5. (U) Regraded ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ on 4 February 1962.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

2 Incl
a/s

Roy A. Stachwick
ROY A. STACHWICK
Major, AI(Arty)
Commanding

Telephone: Kassel Mil 802
HGW/jec

0057

REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL
ON JUN 17 1998
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page 2 of 2 pages
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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

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NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 58-178

04-567324

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

27 January 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS REGION III, 66TH CIC GROUP

EE-567324/d

04

SUBJECT

Polish Intelligence Service - PIS

Re: Modus Operandi (S)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

On 27 December 1957 and 2, 3, 8 and 27 January 1958, Source A-III was interviewed at Field Office Kassel, 66th CIC Group, APC 171, US Army, and furnished the following information concerning Polish Intelligence Service (PIS) Modus Operandi:

INFORMANTS

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

On [REDACTED] Source, who was dissatisfied with conditions in Poland, wanted to return to Germany and decided to flee to Germany [REDACTED] The Polish Border Police arrested Source [REDACTED] and asked Source what he was doing in the area. Source, who believed that he faced long imprisonment and in an attempt to avoid imprisonment, informed the border police that he wanted to contact [REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

No attempt was made to recruit Source; however, [REDACTED] informed Source that if he were patient, [REDACTED] would attempt to aid Source's return to Germany.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

From [REDACTED] Source had frequent [REDACTED]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

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~~Confidential~~

SUBJECT:

Polish Intelligence Service - PIS

Re: Modus Operandi (P)

27 January 1958

EE-567324/d

contact with [REDACTED] and other PIS agents [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Source and [REDACTED] did not become good friends, but Source liked [REDACTED] and whenever they met, they would always exchange greetings.

[REDACTED] (exact date not recalled), Source received word that his application for return to Germany had been disapproved and Source went to the [REDACTED] and requested to see [REDACTED]. Source was directed to a man who introduced himself as [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] Source informed [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] had promised Source that he would be able to return to Germany and requested to know why his application had been disapproved. [REDACTED] informed Source that he had an excellent reputation [REDACTED] and among the members of PIS. [REDACTED] further informed Source to be patient and that soon the borders between Germany and Poland would be open for travel. [REDACTED] did not make any attempt to recruit Source.

Source continued to have frequent contact with [REDACTED]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

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~~Confidential~~

SUBJECT:
Polish Intelligence Service - PIS
Re: Modus Operandi (S)

27 January 1958

EE-567324/d

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

~~Confidential~~

~~Confidential~~

SUBJECT:

Polish Intelligence Service - PIS

Re: Modus Operandi (S)

27 January 1958

EE-567324/d

[REDACTED]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

Contacts

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

-4- 0182

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT:
Polish Intelligence Service - PIS
Re: Modus Operandi (C)

27 January 1958

EE-567324/d

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

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~~Confidential~~

SUBJECT:

Polish Intelligence Service - PIS

Re: Modus Operandi (S)

27 January 1958

EE-567324/d

not required to sign a receipt for the money. Source never received any other payment from PIS.

COMMUNICATION

In [REDACTED] Source was instructed that he could contact [REDACTED] after completion of his PIS mission and a meeting could be scheduled. Source does not remember the telephone number supplied by [REDACTED]

TRANSPORTATION

Automobile

In [REDACTED] picked Source up at Source's place of employment and drove Source to a secluded area [REDACTED] used the following vehicle:

Type: Sedan
Manufacturer: [REDACTED]
Color: [REDACTED]
License number: Unknown

Bus

Source traveled from [REDACTED] to accomplish his PIS mission by public bus.

SECURITY FACTORS

Cover names

In [REDACTED] asked Source what name Source would want to use if Source were on a secret PIS mission and Source replied that he would use the name [REDACTED] expressed his approval.

Silence Pledge

On [REDACTED] requested Source to sign a silence pledge which stated in substance that Source would never discuss his PIS contacts or his PIS mission with anyone and that Source could be arrested and imprisoned for violation of the pledge. } scP

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5 USC 552 (b) (7)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (7)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CCC CENTRAL FILE

AEUC-SCCE; EE-567324/d/s

6 June 1957

SUBJECT: Polish Intelligence Service (U)

10 JUN 1957

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: AEAGB-C(OA)

1. Forwarded herewith in triplicate are copies of Summaries of Information, Subject as above, dated 22 May 1957.

2. Source of the information is [REDACTED]

3. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incls:

SOI's Rgn VIII, dtd 22 May 57 (trip)(C) GEORGE T. NAKAMURA
Captain, MI (Armor)
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt M11 8244
DER/NAV/RC/dt

M/R: Transmits SOI's of PIS M/O and installations.

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

LOG FILE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

22 May 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Division D-567324/d

1h

SUBJECT

Polish Intelligence Service
RH: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. In [redacted] Source was summoned to the office of a [redacted] shop in [redacted] Poland, [redacted]. Upon reporting to the office, he was met by two agents of the UBP (Urząd Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego - Office of Public Security) [redacted]. One agent was named [redacted] but the other agent's name was not mentioned. Source was briefly questioned as to his employment and his German background by [redacted] with the second agent standing by. [redacted] then ordered Source to meet him [redacted].

[redacted] Before departing from the office, Source was obliged to sign a statement to the effect that he would not mention anything concerning the conversation to a second person.

2. [redacted] Source met the unknown agent at the appointed time and place [redacted]. He was then taken to the UBP [redacted] where he was interviewed concerning his background, membership in the Hitler Jugend (Hitler Youth) and the NSDAP as well as his service in the World War II [redacted]. He was also questioned concerning other persons of German descent formerly residing in the area of [redacted] who had also belonged to such organizations but who now lived in the [redacted]. Source furnished numerous names of such persons believing such information was already known to the UBP. He was then questioned as to which of these persons had illegally crossed the border from Poland into Germany. Source was requested to place all of the information in writing, which he refused to do. He was then sent home and told to be at the rendezvous, [redacted].

3. Source met [redacted] at the appointed time and place and was then accompanied by [redacted] to the UBP [redacted]. He was again interviewed concerning the persons he had mentioned previously. He was told that he had not reported all he knew concerning the persons who had illegally left Poland and therefore, because he was withholding information from the UBP, he was liable to arrest and imprisonment. [redacted] then stated that legal action would not be taken against Source providing he would work as an informant for the UBP. To avoid such action, Source agreed to work as an informant. He was assigned the cover name [redacted] and required to sign a statement to the effect that he would always carry out his orders and obligations to the Polish Government and that he would maintain secrecy concerning his activities for and contact with the UBP.

4. [redacted] then directed Source to meet him, [redacted] at the rendezvous point, [redacted] on a day arranged at each previous meeting, [redacted]. Source subsequently met [redacted] at the pre-arranged [redacted] would give

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5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

22 May 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Division D-567324/a

JMM/1h

SUBJECT

Polish Intelligence Service
RE: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE

COMPLETELY RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION:

A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
B PROBABLY TRUE 2
C POSSIBLY TRUE 3
D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
E IMPROBABLE 5
F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Source written orders as to what his tasks were to be for the following two weeks. Source was obliged to read the written order and then sign it with his cover name. Source was assigned the tasks of informing on his fellow employees as to their activities and especially if they were in possession of or distributed leaflets of anti-regime content. Source was also assigned the task of determining whether or not there was contact between a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Source was not able to determine any contact between the two but did determine addresses of acquaintances [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] All reports which Source submitted to [REDACTED] were handwritten and signed with Source's cover name.

5. In [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] When any change was to be made in their meeting plans, [REDACTED] would call Source at Source's place of work [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] used the name [REDACTED] when calling Source on the telephone. In the event [REDACTED] would wish to speak to Source before the designated time and it was impracticable to reach Source by telephone, [REDACTED]

6. In [REDACTED] a new, unnamed agent met Source at an appointment where normally [REDACTED] appeared. Source received the same type of assignment from his new handling agent but the meeting place was changed to a private house located [REDACTED]. Source continued to meet the latter handling agent until [REDACTED]. The last meeting took place on [REDACTED] at which time the handling agent told Source that they were aware of Source's repatriation and it would be possible that another agent from [REDACTED] would come to interview Source before Source departed for Germany. Source had been previously warned that he should not mention anything concerning his activities for the UBP and that if he did so, he would be imprisoned by the Western Powers. Source was not obliged to sign another statement either relieving him from his obligations to the UBP or further binding him to secrecy. He was not contacted by the agent from [REDACTED]

7. Source received small amounts of money while working for the UBP. The amounts varied from 100.00 Zloty to 300.00 Zloty. There were no scheduled payments and Source received the aforementioned sums approximately three

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5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 22 May 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Division D-567324/d

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/lh

SUBJECT

Polish Intelligence Service
RE: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

times.

(F-6)

8. On 1 May 1957, examination of the files maintained by Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, APO 742, failed to identify the persons mentioned in this report. The Modus Operandi, as indicated above, is similar to the MO contained in previous reports, subject and file as above.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON JUN 17 1998
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

0188

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CIC CENTRAL FILE

ABUC-SCCE; EE-567324

10 May 1957

SUBJECT: Polish Intelligence Service (U)

13 MAY 1957

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: ARAGB-C(OA)

1. Forwarded herewith in triplicate are copies of Summary of Information, Subject and file as above, dated 26 April 1957.

2. Source was [REDACTED]
Source was referred to CIC by the [REDACTED]

3. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (E)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

1 Incl:

201, Afn VIII, dtd 26 Apr 57 (trip) (u)

GEORGE T. NAKAMURA
Captain, M1 (Anndr)
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8244
DER/NAW/RC/at

M/R: Above fws MO of PIS internal recruitment obtained from refugee in BLN.

0189

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LOG NR 3 6205

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
26 April 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Division D-567324/d

hjm
13M/1h

SUBJECT

Polish Intelligence Service
RE: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. In [REDACTED] Source was summoned to the [REDACTED]. Upon reporting to the office, Source was turned over to an unnamed UBP (Urząd Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego - Office of Public Security) agent. [REDACTED]

The agent then informed Source that no criminal action would be taken against Source providing he, Source, would agree to work as an informant for the UBP. Source refused and was then beaten by the agent. To avoid further maltreatment and possible prosecution, Source signed an obligation to work as an informant for the UBP. He was required to meet with the unidentified agent at a prearranged meeting place twice a week. Source was given the task of reporting the political atmosphere in his place of employment and the conversations of his fellow workers concerning the Polish Government.

2. Several months later, Source was introduced to another UBP agent, a [REDACTED] by the first unnamed agent. His assignments remained the same but he was required to report to [REDACTED] once a week. In [REDACTED] Source was told to report to the UBP [REDACTED]. Upon reporting to the UBP, he was met by a third UBP agent, [REDACTED]

3. Source was offered [REDACTED] small sums of money for his services to the UBP. [REDACTED]

(F-6)

DISTRIBUTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 0190

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- ☐ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

- ☒ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S) NO DUPLICATION FEE FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 191-193

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY
PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

AMGBI-CI-DI

MAR 26 1953

SUBJECT: Alleged Smuggling of Communists into U.S. by
Polish Agent

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Intelligence
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: Collection and
Dissemination Division

2A011441
Poland

1. Summary of Information inclosure on subject topic is forwarded in the interest of domestic intelligence.

2. Information included herein was obtained by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles Division of the FBI is cognizant.

3. The Intelligence Digest mentioned in the inclosure is believed to be the monthly publication of Ridgway Courcy and Company, Ltd., London, England, which has a New York edition edited by Kenneth de Courcy and published by Intelligence Publishing Company of New York, N. Y.

4. The OAC of S, G-2, Headquarters Third Army, Ft McPherson, Georgia, has been provided this information by separate communication.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:

1 Incl
S/I, subj:
as above
18 Mar 53
(in dupe)

C. A. L. Bickey
C. A. L. BICKEY
Colonel, GS
Chief, CI Division

RECORDS SECTION COPY
Current Section, Rm 5 Br

Kenneth D.

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ON JUN 17 1998
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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26
Mar 53

53396-1
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

- ☒ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 196-215

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
REPORT

SECRET
By Authority of
AC of S, G-2

Initials WTS
Date 4 May 41

Re: Investigations methods working in prisons of Poland
under the Russian Secret Service / N.K.W.D./ control
gathered from sgt. [REDACTED] personal experience.

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

During the German occupation of Poland, [REDACTED] was imprisoned by German authorities on the 12th December 1944 and then after a month sent to Natzweiler concentration camp in Germany.- On the 12th April 1945 he was transferred to Dachau.- After the occupation of Bavaria by the U.S. Army, [REDACTED] joined Guard Training Groups as a driver.-

After a short time, he made up his mind to return to Poland and received all necessary documents from the chief of Polish Repatriation Mission, Mjr. Chmura-Lazarski in Munich.- On the 13th November 1945 he left Munich with some other Poles for Poland.-

In Warsaw he looked after a suitable job and then he was suddenly arrested on the street under the suspicion of spying for foreign country.- For 10 days he was locked in a jail of Public Security Office.-

The room he occupied was small, filthy, dark and full of rats mice and all kind of insects.- An uncovered hole served for W.C. purposes. One blanket and two benches were brought in as sleeping accommodation for seven persons.-

The prisoners were deprived of water and all necessary hygienic implements. With [REDACTED] was imprisoned also an American sergeant who was after few days transferred to another place.-

During 10 days of imprisonment, [REDACTED] was asked for what purpose he came to Poland. He answered that every Pole's duty is to return home and to work for his country. He was told to be a liar and was beaten with wooden flogs. [REDACTED] heard in prison about a man whose penis was crushed with a warden's shoe.-

After 10 days [REDACTED] was transferred to another prison "Mokotow". The food here was very bad.- The daily rations consisted of 400 gr. bread and 1/2 ltr brown-colored water without sugar - for breakfast, 1/2 ltr water with some cabbage leaves and one potato for dinner, white carrots for supper. For Xmas dinner the prisoners received 1 herring, 3 potatoes, 20 dkg cabbage and 1/2 ltr water.- For 24 hours they received only 1 ltr. water to drink.-

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~~SECRET~~
- 2 -

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After seven days begun the first investigations hours, day and night. All prisoners were questioned by Russinas in Russian and German. As a rule 20 % of questions are formal such as: by whom and for what purpose he was sent to Poland, what he knows about the U.S.Army in Germany and other Poles living in U.S.zone, and 80% are abstract questions such as: do you like candy?

The frequently applied method consists of leaving the prisoner in his room where on the table remains a pistol and then observing prisoner's move.

If a prisoner answers all questions right and they cannot get out of him all they want, the Russians change the method and began to beat the investigated person.

For this purpose they employ Germans, a good many of whom are former Gestapo men. The prison physician is a German officer, but as a rule he has no medicine at his disposal and it is very difficult to get a cure permit.

Concrete cages which are to be found in this prison are often filled with water and people locked there remain for few days. In winter they take off clothes, open the windows and compel the people to remain on concrete floor, sometimes for the whole night.

The executions are held in prison cellars. The prisoners are taken out of their rooms and put into cellars where a shot behind the neck ends the prisoner's investigation.

The prisoners who are not to be put to death are sent to other concentration camps /majdanek/ 5 USC 552 (b) (6)

When in prison, [REDACTED] met many imprisoned soldiers of the 2nd Polish corps which volunteered from Italy to Poland.

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0217
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BY AUTHORITY OF *Ac. J. Clayton*
BY *JNK*
DATE *13 Nov 1956*

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dot. S Stosunkow panujacych w wiezieniach w Polsce i
metod badania U.B.P. na podstawie zeznan st.sierzanta

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

Wyzej wymieniony st.sierzant [REDACTED] zostal aresztowany przez wladze niemieckie w Polsce 10.12.44. Przez miesiac pozostawal w wiezieniu w kraju, nastepnie wyslany do obozu koncentr. Natzweler w Niemczech, skad przeniesiony do Dachau 12.4.45. Po oswobodzeniu przez arme ameryk., [REDACTED] wstapil do Komp. Wart., gdzie pracowal jako szofer.

[REDACTED] zdecydowal sie na powrot do Polski. Zglosil sie do Polsk. Misji Repatr. w Monachium do mjr. Chmury-Lazarskiego, gdzie dostal potrzebne mu zaswiadczenia na wyjazd. 13.11.45 wyjechal samochodem do Polski wraz z Zagorskim Jerzym, jego zona Maria i Maria Zoladkowska.

Przyjechawszy do Polski udal sie [REDACTED] do Warszawy. w celu znalezienia pracy. Tamze zostal zaaresztowany przez U.B.P. na ulicy Inzynierskiej i odstawiony do ministerstwa U.B.P. mieszczacego sie przy ul. Szerokiej 12 w dawnym gmachu szpitala zydlowskiego.

Cela, w ktorej zostal zamkniety byla mala i ciemna. Podloga betonowa wciaz wilgotna. Na 7 osob byly dwie lawki drewniane sluzace jako luzka, oraz jeden koc dla wszystkich. Spano wiec na zmianie. W kacie otwor niezakryty po rozbitym ustepie, gdzie gniezdzily sie szczury. Robactwo wszelkiego rodzaju pokrywalo wiezniow. Zadnych srodkow higienicznych, nawet czystej wody do mycia nie mozna bylo dostac.

0218

Razem z [REDACTED] byl rowniez uwiezony jakis podoficer amerykanski, z pochodzenia Polak. Co sie z nim stalo nie wiadomo albowiem zostal przeniesiony gdzie indziej.

Sledztwo zaczelo sie w ministerstwie. Zarzucono [REDACTED] ze przyjechal do Polski jako szpieg i dopytywano sie kto go tu przyslal. Gdy odrzekl, ze przyjechal do Polski, bo jest Polakiem i chce pracowac, zarzucano mu klamstwo i bito drewnianymi palkami w piety. Opowiadl, ze jednemu z wiezniow polozono penis na lawce, a zolnierz zmiazdzyl go obcasem.

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-2-

~~SECRET~~

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

Po 10 dniach przewieziono [REDACTED] do wiezienia śledczego na Mokotowie, którego naczelnikiem jest [REDACTED] Rozanski a zastępcą również [REDACTED] Humel. Wszyscy więźniowie, którzy nie przyznają się do winy są odtransportowani do wiezienia śledczego.

[REDACTED] został zamknięty w celi Nr.25, skąd zapamiętał dwa nazwiska swych współtowarzyszy: Gluzinski Przemyslaw, którego śledztwo trwało już 8 miesięcy i Bogdana Banaszewskiego-Bukowski go 1 miesiąc. Obaż oskarżeni o przynależność do konspiracji.

Przez pierwszy tydzień nie był badany, natomiast zorientował się w panujących tamże stosunkach. Posadzka w celi była kamienna, spano na siennikach, jeden przypadał na trzech więźniów. Wody do mycia nie było, ustep był w celi /na innych pietrach ust ustepow w celach nie było, przyczem wyprowadzano więźniów raz na dobe, a załatwianie się w międzyczasie było karane/

Wyżywienie w więzieniu: 400 gr. chleba czerstwego na dobe 1/2 ltr. kawy rano /brązowa woda bez cukru/ na obiad : 1/2 ltr zupy /skład: woda, pare listków kapusty, 1 ziemniak/.- Kolacja: marchew pastewna, brukiew, raz w tyg. kasza/ Wigilia więźniów składała się z 1 śledzia, 3 ziemniaków, 20 dkg kapusty 1/2 ltr kawy. Na dobe dostają 1 ltr wody do picia.

Po tygodniu zaczyna się śledztwo. Godziny przesłuchani są w nocy i w dzień. Na śledztwo prowadzi strażnik, więźniowi nie wolno się rozglądać, chociaż nigdy nie spotyka się z innymi więźniami. Specjalni inspekcyjni kierują ruchem na korytarzu.

0219

Przepytują przeważnie moskale w języku rosyjskim i niemieckim. Zadają szereg pytań, różnej treści z czego mniej więcej 20 % dotyczy kwestii formalnej, a 80 % pytań jest oderwanych. Notują pytania i odpowiedzi. Po przesłuchaniu odprowadza się więźnia z powrotem do celi /czas badania trwa nieraz kilka godzin. Na drugi dzień zadaje się znowu więźniowi te same pytania. Tego rodzaju śledztwo może trwać i cały rok. Podczas badania odnoszą się do więźnia przeważnie grzecznie, częściej nerwowo, obie-

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5 USC 552 (b) (6)

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- 3 - ~~SECRET~~

cuja poprawe wyzywienia jesli oskarzony przyzna sie do winy.

Tresc pytan zasadniczych jest nastepujaca: kto wyslal z Niemiec, po co, co wiadomo o Brygadzie, rozmieszczenie wojsk amerykanskich, sila i ilosc tychze, uzbrojenie armii U.S., nowe typy samolotow i czołgow, nastawienie amerykanow do Rosji, sprawa wyzywienia w zonie U.S. Pytania inne sa najrozmaitsze np. jaka bedzie jutro pogoda, czy lubi czekolade i tp. Uzywa sie rowniez roznym podstepow przy badaniu np. zostawia sie wieznia samego w biurze gdzie lezy na stole pistolet, daje sie moznosc ucieczki i tp.

Jezeli wiezien odpowiada zawsze zgodnie na wszystkie pytania i nie orzyznaje sie do winy, rozpoczyna sie druga czesc sledztwa: bicie,-

Krzyki bitych rozlegaja sie w calym wiezieniu. Bija niemcy-gestapowcy drewnia nemi palkami do utraty przytomnosci. Zamyka sie wiezniow do klatek betonowych, napelnionych woda i pozostawia sie nieraz na przeciąg kilku dni, lub w zimie rozebranych kladzie sie na posadzke betonowa, zlana woda i otwiera sie okna.

Gdy bicie samego wieznia nie pomaga sprowadza sie do wiezienia osoby z jego rodziny /matka, zona/ i bije sie na oczach wieznia.

0220

Egzekucje odbywaja sie w piwnicach. Wyprowadza sie wiezniow z celi i nic nie mowiac im o wyroku, prowadzi sie na ~~do~~ dom. Tam, przwaznie strzal z pistoletu w tyl glowy jest zakonczeniem sledztwa. Nieska zani na wyrok smierci sa odsylani do obozow koncentracyjnych np. Majdanek.

Lekarz wiezienny jest niemcem, oficerem Wehrmachtu / w mundurze/. Brak zupełny lekarstw i narzedzi chirurgicznych. Na leczenie trzeba miec specjalne pozwolenie od naczelnika wiezienia, ktore to jest bardzo trudno uzyskac.

Wieżniowie w czasie sledztwa nie dostaja zadnej prasy

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gen. Andersa, którzy dobrowolnie powrocili do kraju, uwiezionych
wraz z innymi na Mokotowie.

Sciany wiezieni~~ax~~ sa zapisane monogramami zolnierzy
A.K., daty rozne z czasow jeszcze okupacji niemieckiej jak i juz
po zakonczeniu wojny.

0221

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BY	<i>JNS</i>
DATE	<i>13 Dec 1956</i>

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DOSSIER NO. ZF 400.226

As of 5 OCT 88 all material included
(Date)

in this file conforms with DA policies currently
in effect.

Lillian J. Young 5 OCT 88
(Signature) (Date Signed)

Lillian J. Young GS 7
(Printed Name) (Grade)

JP AR 381-10
REVIEWER
DATE
REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA
JP AR 381-10
REVIEWER H. McHenry 25 Sep 92
DATE
REVIEWED BY ARCHIVIST
DATE
Angle 13 Nov 91

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT		
<p>NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.</p>		<p>525A This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report. HN-095-74</p>
<p>1. COUNTRY: POLAND</p> <p>2. SUBJECT: (U) [REDACTED] Recruitment Attempt by the Polish Security Service</p> <p>3. ISC NUMBER: 5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)</p> <p>4. DATE OF INFORMATION: May 1971</p> <p>5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Hannover, Germany 1 April 1974</p> <p>6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6</p> <p>7. SOURCE: [REDACTED]</p> <p>8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 4572 74 (3004-02).</p> <p>9. DATE OF REPORT: 22 April 1974</p> <p>10. NO. OF PAGES: 3</p> <p>11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 637, 6C 5 USC 552a (b) (1) 5 USC 552 (b) (6)</p> <p>12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Co, APO NY 09108</p> <p>13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]</p> <p>14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [REDACTED] RICHARD E. EVERS COL, MI Commanding</p>		
<p>15. SUMMARY:</p> <p>(S) This report contains information on an apparent attempt on the part of the Polish Security Service to recruit Source. The report also contains fragmentary biographic data on [REDACTED] who attempted to recruit the Source.</p> <p>5 USC 552a (b) (1) 5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)</p> <p>RELEASABLE TO U.K., CANADA</p> <p>"This information is furnished with the understanding that it will not be disclosed or knowledge of its possession revealed to any other Nation or Party without specific authority from the Defense Intelligence Agency of the United States of America. That it will not be used for other than military purposes. That the rights of the individual or persons originating in the development of the information, whether it is intended or not, will be respected and protected in accordance with the patent laws of the [REDACTED] of the originator. That it will be provided substantially the same degree of security protection afforded to it by the Department of Defense of the United States."</p> <p>REPORT:</p> <p>1. (S) Source [REDACTED] Source, [REDACTED], was a resident of [REDACTED] where she worked [REDACTED]</p> <p>Source came to the FRG in December 1973 as a visitor, and reported to [REDACTED] on [REDACTED]. She is now in possession of her West German Identity Booklet.</p>		<p>(Leave Blank)</p> <p>841</p> <p>201360 201300 201910</p>
<p>16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:</p> <p>1-DIA 4-USAREUR 1-USMCOM 1-USAF 1-USATSA-E 1-EUDAC 1-430th MI Det 1-PSYOPS 3-CCPFA 5-BSIA(G)</p> <p>(b)(1) (b)(7)(D)</p>	<p>17. DOWNGRADING DATA:</p> <p>CLASSIFIED BY DIAM 58-11 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY (2) DECLASSIFY ON: CANNOT BE DETERMINED</p> <p>0223</p>	<p>18. ENCLOSURE DATA:</p> <p>None</p>

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

REPORT NO. 2 218 4572 74
PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES
ORIGINATOR 66th MI Gp
APO NY 09108

(Classification and Control Markings)

(Leave Blank)

2. ~~(S)~~ Recruitment Attempt

[REDACTED]

3. ~~(S)~~ Source's Analysis of the Offer

[REDACTED]

4. ~~(S)~~ Biographic Data on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

0224

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5 USC 552a (b) (1)
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)
5 USC 552a (b) (1)
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

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REPORT NO. 2 218 4572 74
PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES
ORIGINATOR 66th MI Gp
APO NY 09108

COMMENTS:

(c) Source was of average intelligence and cooperative. Her credibility, however, could not be confirmed. [REDACTED] The information in the remainder of the report appears to be highly credible though.

(Leave Blank)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 0225

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. COUNTRY: POLAND

REPORT NUMBER: 2-101-0017-73

2. SUBJECT: Polish Intelligence Service Operations (U)

9. DATE OF REPORT: 28 August 1973

10. NO. OF PAGES: 2

3. ISC NUMBER:

11. REFERENCES: DIRM 6A2d, 6B5, 6B6a, 6B7a, 6B8 & 6E

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: August 1973

12. ORIGINATOR: 902d Military Intelligence Group, Falls Church, Virginia

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: [REDACTED] United States, 17 August 1973

13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED] SA, 902d MI Group

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 2

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

7. SOURCE: 2 101 0033 (U)

WILLIAM S. WOLF
Colonel, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

(S) This report contains information concerning operational methods, communications systems, targets (EEI), and source payment procedures used by the Polish Intelligence Service (PIS) operatives in the United States.

(Leave Blank)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

Classified by [REDACTED]
by USAIRR

73 339 2168

1. (S) [REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

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ACSI-DAMI-DOI
DAMI-FII
DAMI-DOA

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

Classified by DDPUSAINTC
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2
DECLASSIFY ON NA

0226

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~~SECRET~~

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

None.

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902d #S-73
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
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 101-0017-75
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
ORIGINATOR 902d MI Group
Falls Church, Virginia

2. (S) [REDACTED] Leave Blank
3. (S) [REDACTED] 5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)
4. (S) [REDACTED] 5 USC 552a (b) (1)
5. (S) [REDACTED] 5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)
6. (S) [REDACTED] 5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

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5250

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.
HN-1148-73

*Polish
Diff/Doc*

1. COUNTRY: POLAND
2. SUBJECT: (U) [REDACTED] Possible Intelligence Collection Activities
3. ISC NUMBER: 5 USC 552a (b) (1)
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: October 1972
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Hannover, Germany
20 March 1973
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE [REDACTED] INFORMATION [REDACTED]
7. SOURCE: [REDACTED]
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 4744 73 (5004-02)
9. DATE OF REPORT: 19 April 1973
10. NO. OF PAGES: 2
11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B4, 6B6a, 6B7
12. ORIGINATOR: 5 USC 552 (b) (6)
66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108
13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [REDACTED] CPT, MI
for EUGENE KELLEY, JR.
COL, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY REPORT:
1. Source
Source lived in [REDACTED] until October 1972. From February 1971 until October 1972, she worked as a floor supervisor in [REDACTED]. Her information depends partly on personal observations and friends' observations.
2. The [REDACTED]
The [REDACTED] is between [REDACTED]. A more exact description of the location could not be gotten from Source. There was a total of 369 beds. The manager of the hotel was [REDACTED]. He was a member of the Voluntary Police Reserve (ORMO). The assistant manager was [REDACTED] born in [REDACTED]. The manager for Hotel Affairs (Kierownik Dzialu Hotelowego) was [REDACTED] born about [REDACTED]. She was described by Source as intelligent, respectable, and broad-minded. [REDACTED] also spoke German, French, and Russian. The manager for Reservations (Kierownik czesci noclegowej) was [REDACTED] born about [REDACTED]. Hotel guests were mostly Poles, East and West Germans, Swedes, Danes, Englishmen and less often, French and Russians. Since 1971, two militia officials, a sergeant major, and an NCO lived on the third floor. For a room and breakfast, they paid a lump sum of 700 or 800 Zlotys a month. Source did not know what duties the militia officials performed or whether they belonged to the police, criminal police, or security service. Source had forgotten their names. Source never got the impression that the police were there to watch over the hotel. While registering, Polish guests had to show their identification

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802200
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202300
201600
806270

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
3-USAREUR
Following without encl
1-EUCOM
1-USAFE
1-V Corps
1-VII Corps
1-EEIC
1-66th MI Gp, 430th MID
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MID
1-USASPD
1-CINCUSNAVEUR
1-OSI
1-PSY OPS

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

CLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED]
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DE-CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 1
DECLASSIFICATION DATE CAN NOT BE DETERMINED

0223
0204-402
RECEIVED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

1 Encl:

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)
5 USC 552 (b) (1)

DD FORM 1396

0

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 4744 73

PAGE 2

OF 2

PAGES

ORIGINATOR

66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108

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(Dow'd Osobyste). Foreign guests had to show their passports at the reception desk. Source was not familiar with the formalities of registration. There were two differently colored registration forms for Poles and foreigners, (colors unknown). These forms were given to the police three times a week. At the personal request of the police, the reception desk was directed to ask in a "police and inconspicuous manner" for particular guests to hand over their passports. The receptionist was supposed to say that the registration form had been lost, and that he needed the passport again. The hotel guest was told that he was known and could therefore move about freely outside the hotel without his passport. Source knew no details about the further handling of the passports. Telephone calls to foreign countries were monitored by the post office (Source heard this many times from hotel employees). As far as Source knew, no conversations could be monitored in the hotel. In-country calls were only monitored by order of the police when they had reason to be suspicious. Monthly salaries of Hotel Personnel were as follows:

Manager	4500 Zlotys Gross
Assistant Manager	3600 Zlotys Gross
Manager for Hotel Affairs ca.	3000 Zlotys gross (was to have been increased by 300 Zlotys on 1 Jan 73)
Manager for Reservations	2800 Zlotys Gross (was to have been increased by 400 Zlotys on 1 Jan 73)
Floor Supervisor	2400 Zlotys gross minus 200 Zlotys monthly deductions -2200

For being able only to speak a foreign language, 65 Zlotys a month extra were paid; for also having written knowledge of the foreign language, 125 Zlotys a month were paid.

3. (c) Exchange Rates

At the General Savings Bank ("PKO" or Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci), one Dollar could be exchanged for 72 Zlotys. At the Polish National Bank, one Dollar could be exchanged for 24 Zlotys. One Dollar on the black market is worth from 100 to 105 Zlotys. One DMW is exchanged for 18 to 20 Zlotys at the PKO, about seven at the National Bank, and about 30 Zlotys on the black market. One DME is worth five Zlotys at the PKO; One Ruble at the National Bank equals 15.60 Zlotys, or 20 Zlotys on the black market.

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17 JUN 1998
14 US-100-100-100
ADP-100-100-100

0229

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(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396c

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- ☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

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- ☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 230-236

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DELETED PAGE(S) NO DUPLICATION FEE FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 237-239

*Relief
Encl 60c*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Classification and Control Markings)

528G
This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.
MZ-1639-72

1. COUNTRY: POLAND	8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 2550 73 (5004-06)
2. SUBJECT: (U) [REDACTED] SB Approach of Ethnic German	9. DATE OF REPORT: 19 February 1973
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 2
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: August 1972	11. REFERENCES: SICR: U-GEF-G0482 DIRM: 6B4, 6B7
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Mainz, Germany 2 February 1973	12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group, APO New York 09108
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION	13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]
7. SOURCE: [REDACTED]	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: <i>Eugene Kelley, Jr.</i> EUGENE KELLEY, JR. COL, MI Commanding

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

15. SUMMARY:
(U) Information [REDACTED] concerns two SB attempts to recruit Source for work in West Germany. Information is also given on two SB members.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)
5 USC 552 (b) (1)

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DS-402
MAR 12 1 50 PM '73

201310-PL


REPORT:

1. (U) Source [REDACTED]

2. (U) [REDACTED]

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: 1-DIA 3-USAREUR The following are w/o encl: 1-EUCOM 1-USAF 1-V Corps 1-VII Corps 1-EEIC 1-16th MI Gp, 430th MI Det 1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det 1-USASFD 1-CINCSNAVEUR 1-OSI 1-PSYOPS	17. DOWNGRADING DATA: CLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED] EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY (1) DECLASSIFICATION DATE CANNOT BE DETERMINED	18. ENCLOSURE DATA: 1 Encl: [REDACTED]
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2:218 2550 73

PAGE 2 OF PAGES

ORIGINATOR

66th MI Group,
APO New York 09108

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3. ~~(S)~~ Recruiting Attempt

5 USC 552 (b) (2)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

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5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

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FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 242-244

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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Page(s) 245-247

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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(Classification and Control Markings)

EO4193 (A)
This report contains unprocessed information.
Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.
93-139-72

*Polish
Int/Svc*

1. COUNTRY: POLAND, AUSTRIA, WEST BERLIN

8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 0055 73

2. SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

9. DATE OF REPORT: 16 January 1973

3. ISC NUMBER:

10. NO. OF PAGES: 3

11. REFERENCES: 6B7a

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 7 October 1969 -
15 September 1972

12. ORIGINATOR: Detachment B
66th MI Group

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: West Berlin
18 October 1972

13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6

APPROVING AUTHORITY: EUGENE KELLEY, JR.
COL, MI
Commanding

7. SOURCE: [REDACTED]

15. SUMMARY: [REDACTED]

(Leave Blank)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
3-USAEUR
1-EUCOM
1-IRCD
1-USASA, Eur
1-66th MI Gp, AFPMI-OA-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

CLASSIFIED BY USAREUR REG 383-3
X FROM GDS OF EO 11652
X CATEGORY 2
DECLASSIFY ON: CANNOT BE PRE-DETERMINED

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

None

204-SG
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CL. 13 5 8 81

0248

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 212 0055 73
PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES
ORIGINATOR Detachment B
66th MI Group

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 212 0055 73
PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES
ORIGINATOR Detachment B
66th MI Group

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ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS:

5 USC 552 (b) (1)
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

VZCZCSCD542 QS#4430 REUP 374636 0131200
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ZNY CCCCC

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~~P R 121413Z JAN 73~~
~~FM DTC SLEB MUNICH GER~~
TO RUEKJCS/ DIA WASHINGTON D C ATTN: DS-4C
RUFDAAA/ USAREUR DCSI HEIDELBERG GER//AEAGB-P(CISIC)/ AEAGB-C(CM)//
~~INFO/ RUEADWD/ DA WASHINGTON D C //DAMI/CIA//~~
RUSNAAA/ USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER//EECJB-A//
RUFTODA/ CDR USASA OFFICE EUROLE AUGSBURG GER//IAETSA/(TARES)//
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THIS IS IR NO. 2 212 0868 73

1. (U) POLAND/WEST GERMANY
2. (U) PRIZE CONTEST POSSIBLY SPONSORED BY POLISH INTELLIGENCE
3. (U) N/A
4. (U) 3 NOV 1972
5. (U) 12 JAN 1973, MUNICH, FRG
6. (U) B-2
7. (U) SEE COMMENTS
8. (U) 2 212 0868 73(B17400) (G)
9. (U) 12 JAN 1973
10. (U) 1
11. (U) DIRM: 6B7 . IR 2 212 2089 72
12. (U) 66TH MI GROUP
13. (U) [REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

14. (U) EUGENE KELLEY JR., COL, MI, COMMANDING
15. (U) ON 3 NOV 72, POLISH RADIO (POLSKIE RADIO), WARSAW -1, PO BOX 46, MAILED SEVERAL HUNDRED CIRCULARS ANNOUNCING A PRIZE CONTEST TO VARIOUS RESIDENTS OF WEST GERMANY. A LARGE PORTION OF THE ENVELOPES WAS ADDRESSED WITH ADDRESSOGRAPH PLATES WHICH INDICATES THAT THE CIRCULARS WERE MEANT FOR PERSONS WHO ARE IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH THAT AGENCY. HOWEVER, A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE ENVELOPES WAS ADDRESSED BY TYPEWRITER WHICH INDICATES THAT THE RECIPIENTS ARE NEW CONTACTS WHO HAVE NOT BEEN INDEXED AS YET ON ADDRESSOGRAPH PLATES. THE FOLLOWING IS A TRANSLATION OF THE UNCLASSIFIED CONTEST CIRCULAR:

(U) " TEN DAY TRIPS THROUGH POLAND AND NUMEROUS OTHER VALUABLE PRIZES CAN BE WON IN THE NEW PRIZE CONTEST OF POLISH RADIO. TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DRAWING IT WILL SUFFICE IF YOU ANSWER ONE OF THE

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON JUN 17 1998
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

0251

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

1. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO CONTINUE FURTHERING PEACEFUL INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION?
2. WHICH EVENTS HAVE CONTRIBUTED MOST TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATION BETWEEN YOUR COUNTRY AND POLAND?
3. IN WHAT FIELDS CAN THE COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES BE BEST EXPANDED?

ANSWERS, MARKED " PRIZE CONTEST, " SHOULD BE SENT TO POLSKIE RADIO, WARSZAWA 1, BOX 46, POLAND. DEADLINE FOR ENTRIES IS 31 DEC 72 AND THE POSTMARK COUNTS. THE RESULTS OF THE CONTEST WILL BE ANNOUNCED ON 31 JAN 73 IN ALL BROADCASTS OF THE FOREIGN PROGRAM OF POLISH RADIO. THE TRIPS THROUGH POLAND WILL TAKE PLACE AT A TIME ARRANGED BY POLISH RADIO. WE INVITE YOU TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONTEST AND WISH YOU LOTS OF LUCK IN THE DRAWING."

COMMENTS(C): INFO IS SUBMITTED BECAUSE HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES HAVE IN THE PAST USED THE " CONTEST SCHEME, " WHERE TOP PRIZES CONSISTED OF TRIPS BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN, FOR RECRUITMENT PURPOSES. WE HAVE LAST REPORTED A SIMILAR CONTEST IN IR 2 212 2089 72 AND HAVE USED DIA DAMI-A EVALUATION TO THIS IR AS GUIDANCE FOR REPEAT REPORTING. INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED FROM A

NO FURTHER DETAILS AVAILABLE.

XGDS-1
BT
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(b)(1)
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

121413Z JAN 73
Pg 2

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Page(s) 253-275

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Page(s) 276-277

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(Classification and Control Markings)

529G

This report contains unprocessed information.

Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report. ST-3163-72

1. COUNTRY: POLAND
2. SUBJECT: [REDACTED]
3. ISC NUMBER: 5 USC 552 (b) (1)
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: October 1971
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Stuttgart, Germany 25 May 1972
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION
7. SOURCE: [REDACTED]
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 5529 72 (5004-08)
9. DATE OF REPORT: 17 July 1972
10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
11. REFERENCES: SICR: U-GEF-G0482
DIRM: 6B6a, 7A6
12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group, APO New York 09108
13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: Richard W. Kelley, Jr., M
EUGENE KELLEY, JR
COL, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

(Leave Blank)

[REDACTED]

0278

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
3-USAREUR, w/o Incl
1-EUCOM, w/o Incl
1-USAF, w/o Incl
1-V Corps, w/o Incl
1-VII Corps, w/o Incl
1-EEIC, w/o Incl
1-66th MI Gp, 430th MI Det, w/o Incl
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det, w/o Incl
1-SF Det (Abn) Eur, w/o Incl
1-USASPD, w/o Incl
Continued to Bloc Nr 17

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

CLASSIFIED BY DIAM 58-11
X FROM GDS OF EO 11652
X CATEGORY 1
DECLASSIFY ON:
CANNOT BE DETERMINED

1-CINCPAC, w/o Incl
1-OSI, w/o Incl
1-PSYOPS, w/o Incl

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(Classification and Control Markings)

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

1 Encl:
[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

REC'D DS-4C2 07 AUG 1972

201300
202300
202300
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5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

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5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D) 5 USC 552 (b) (1)

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Page(s) 279-284

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Page(s) 285-286

C 595

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT			
<p>NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.</p>		<p>CONFIDENTIAL WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED (Classification and Control Markings)</p>	<p>B17400 (G) This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report. B174-252/72</p>
1. COUNTRY: POLAND/WEST GERMANY	8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 2039 72	<p>B</p> <p>REC'D DS-4C2 21 JUL 1972</p>	
2. SUBJECT: Prize Contest Possibly Sponsored by Polish Intelligence (U)	9. DATE OF REPORT: 29 June 1972		
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 2		
11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 687 IR: 2 212 0570 72			
5 USC 552 (b) (6)			
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 5 May 1972	12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group		
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Munich, Germany 28 June 1972	13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]		
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 2	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: Eugene M. Kelley, OAC EUGENE KELLEY JR COL, MI Commanding		
7. SOURCE: See Comments			
15. SUMMARY: (U) This report consists of a translation of a prize contest circular originating with Polish Radio in WARSAW, which was distributed by mail to residents of West Germany on 5 May 1972.		(Leave Blank)	
<p>WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED</p>			
(U) On 5 May 1972, Polish Radio (Polskie Radio), WARSAW-1, PO Box 46, mailed at least 1,705 circulars, announcing a prize contest, to various residents of West Germany. All envelopes were addressed with addressograph plates which consist of the index card number preceded by the language designator (P=Polish; N=German) and the address of the recipient. The fact that addressograph plates were used indicates that recipients of the circular are in regular contact with the radio station. About 2/3 of the circulars were in German and 1/3 in Polish. A review of the names of the recipients indicated that a substantial number are of ethnic Polish origin. The following is a translation of the contest circular:		<p>241114-11L 247244-11L 145115-126, 6E</p>	
(U) "A 10-day trip through Poland and numerous other valuable prizes and souvenirs can be won in the new prize contest of Polish Radio.			
16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: 1-DIA 2-USAREUR 1-ACSI-CIPC 1-EUCOM 1-USASAE 1-66th MIGp, AEUTMI-OA-IR	17. DOWNGRADING DATA: CLASSIFIED BY: USAREUR REG 383-3 X FROM GDS OF EO 11652 X CATEGORY 1 DECLASSIFY ON: CANNOT BE DETERMINED	18. ENCLOSURE DATA:	
0287		REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON JUN 17 1998 BY CDR USAINSCOM F01 PO AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R	
EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE		<p>CONFIDENTIAL WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED</p>	

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT		
CONTINUATION SHEET	CONFIDENTIAL WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED (Classification and Control Markings)	REPORT NO. 212 2080 72 PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES ORIGINATOR 56th MI Group
<p>(U) To participate in the drawing it will suffice if you answer one of the following questions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Which Polish athletes have the chance of winning a medal at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich? 2. What role should Olympic Games play in the present world? <p>Please send the answers, marked "KONKURS" to</p> <p>Polskie Radio, WARSZAWA-1, Box 46, Poland</p> <p>Deadline for entries is 15 June 1972, the postmark counts.</p> <p>The results of the contest will be announced on 30 June 1972 in all broadcasts of the foreign program of Polish Radio.</p> <p>The trip through Poland will take place at a time arranged by Polish Radio.</p> <p>We invite you to participate in the contest and wish you lots of luck in the drawing."</p>		(Leave Blank)
<p><u>COMMENTS (U):</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The information is submitted because hostile intelligence services have, in the past, used the "contest" scheme where top prizes consisted of trips behind the iron curtain for recruitment purposes. We have last reported a similar contest in IR 2 212 0570 72. 2. Information was received from [REDACTED] No further details available. 		
<p>NOTE (U): Attention is directed to paragraph 3a(2), AR 381-1.</p>		
<p>EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</p>		
<p>0288</p>		
<p>DD FORM 1396c</p>		
<p>CONFIDENTIAL WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED</p>		

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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DELETED PAGE(S) NO DUPLICATION FEE FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 289-292

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

523G

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report. DU-1085-72

1. COUNTRY: POLAND
2. SUBJECT: (U) Recruitment of Agents
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: January 1972
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Duesseldorf, Germany 18 April 1972
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION
7. SOURCE:
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 4015 72 (5004-03)
9. DATE OF REPORT: 9 May 1972
10. NO. OF PAGES: 2
11. REFERENCES: SIGR: U-GEF-G0482
DIRM: 6B7
12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group, APO New York 09108
13. PREPARED BY: EUGENE KELLEY, JR
COL, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY:
(U) (NO FOREIGN DISSEM) contains limited information on the attempts by the SB to recruit ethnic Germans, who are resettling to West Germany, to work for them as informants.

(Leave Blank)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

REPORT:

1. (U) (NO FOREIGN DISSEM) Attempted SB-recruitment of German resettlers from Silesia

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:
1-DIA
3-USAREUR, 1 w/o Incl
1-EUCOM, w/o Incl
1-USAFE, w/o Incl
1-USASAE, w/o Incl
1-V Corps, w/o Incl
1-VII Corps, w/o Incl
1-EEIC, w/o Incl
1-66th MI Gp, 430th MI Det, w/o Incl
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det, w/o Incl
1-SF Det (Abn) Eur, w/o Incl
1-USASPD, w/o Incl
continued to Bloc Nr 17

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:
GROUP-1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:
1 Encl:

CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DD FORM 1396
1 SEP 62

(b)(1)
(b)(7)(C)
293
(Classification and Control Markings)

2d/184-PL
2d/131-PL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

(b)(1) NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(b)(7)(D)

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 4015 72

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

ORIGINATOR
66th MI Group,
APO New York 09108

(Leave Blank)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

2. (U) This information was

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

0294

CONFIDENTIAL
(b)(1) NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(b)(7)(D)
(Classification and Control Markings)

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Page(s) 295

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

523G

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report. DU-1205-71

1. COUNTRY: POLAND
2. SUBJECT: (U) [REDACTED] SB Recruitment Attempt
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: September 1971
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Duesseldorf, Germany 14 January 1972
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE [REDACTED] INFORMATION [REDACTED]
7. SOURCE: [REDACTED]
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 0855 72 (5004-03)
9. DATE OF REPORT: (b) 15 March 1972
10. NO. OF PAGES: 4
11. REFERENCES: SICR: U-GEF-G0482
DIRM: 6B7, 6B4, 7A2a
12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108
13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [REDACTED] EUGENE KELLEY, JR.
COL, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY: (U) [REDACTED] Information [REDACTED] concerns Source's agreement to do intelligence work for Poland after his resettlement to West Germany. (Leave Blank)

REPORT:

1. (U) [REDACTED] Source

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
3-USAREUR
1-EUCOM w/o encl
1-USAFE w/o encl
1-V Corps w/o encl
1-VII Corps w/o encl
1-ACSI w/o encl
1-IRCD w/o encl
1-SF Det (Abn) Eur w/o encl
1-USASPD w/o encl
1-OSI w/o encl

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

1 Encl

ENCLOSURE HAS NOT BEEN
REPRODUCED
REQUEST ENCL FROM DS-4A

CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 0855 72

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

ORIGINATOR
66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108

(Leave Blank)

2. ~~(S)~~ District Office

The District Office of the State Security Service in the Militia HQ (formerly the main administrative office of the railroad service) is in Room

3. ~~(S)~~ Recruiting Attempts

a. Preliminary Details

In about 1966 Source, who had applied for permission to resettle in West Germany, was told to report to the Militia Office in . A civilian employee, name unknown, had a short conversation with Source. In this he asked Source to do intelligence work for the Polish State after leaving for West Germany.

b. 1st Phase: Approach by the State Security Service

c. 2d Phase: Recruiting Attempt

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

0297

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(Classification and Control Markings)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (1) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1) (D)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 0855 72
PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES
ORIGINATOR
66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108

(Leave Blank)

d. 3d Phase: First Pledge

e. 4th Phase: Second Pledge

4. (D) Report by Source

A few days after Source had signed this pledge [redacted] called him. The phone conversation had the following contents: "Everything is in progress. You must do something more for us. Write a report [redacted] and their intentions concerning leaving the country. [redacted] Bring the report to me." Source wrote a short report, about one side of a DIN-A-4 page and handed it in. [redacted] was not very content with this.

0298

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

(b)(1)
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 0855 72

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

ORIGINATOR

66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108

(Leave Blank)

5. ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] Proposed Means of Contact in
West Germany

[REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

6. ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] Concern with Security

[REDACTED]

7. (U) This information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

0299

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(Classification and Control Markings)

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(Classification and Control Markings)

529G

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.
ST-1644-71

1. COUNTRY: POLAND	8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 0854 72 (5004-08)
2. SUBJECT: (U) SB-Contact Procedures	9. DATE OF REPORT: 29 February 1972
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 4
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: October 1971	11. REFERENCES: SICR: U-GEF G0482 DIRM: 6B6a
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Stuttgart, Germany 15 January 1972	12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group, APO New York 09108
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION	13. PREPARED BY: EUGENE KELLER, JR. COL, MI Commanding
7. SOURCE: [REDACTED]	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

REC'D DS-4C2 04 APR 1972

15. SUMMARY: (U) ~~[REDACTED]~~ This ~~[REDACTED]~~ deals with the recruitment of Source by the SB. ~~[REDACTED]~~

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

124

105313
202600/PL
201940/PL
201800/PL
202163

REPORT:

1. (U) ~~[REDACTED]~~ Source

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:
1-DIA
3-USAREUR, 2 w/o Incl
1-EUCOM, w/o Incl
1-VII Corps, w/o Incl
1-IRCD, w/o Incl
1-66th MI Gp, 430th MI Det,
w/o Incl
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det,
w/o Incl
1-OSI, w/o Incl

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:
GROUP-1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

0300

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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(Classification and Control Markings)

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:
1 Encl:
~~[REDACTED]~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 0854 72

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

ORIGINATOR
66th MI Group,
APO New York 09103

(Leave Blank)

2. (C) [REDACTED] Recruitment for Intelligence
Activities by SB in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

3. (C) [REDACTED] Personal Data of Source's
Interlocutor

[REDACTED]

4. (C) [REDACTED] Further Contact

[REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

0301

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 0854 72
PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES
ORIGINATOR
66th MI Group,
APO New York 09108

(Leave Blank)

5. (S)

Personal Data of the Civilian

6. (S)

Signing of Data

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

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(Classification and Control Markings)

CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 0854 72
PAGE 11 OF 11 PAGES
ORIGINATOR
56th MI Group,
APO New York 09108

(Leave Blank)

7. (U) This information

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

0303

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5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

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Page(s) 304-314

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Page(s) 315-318

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

525C

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

HN-1613-71

1. COUNTRY: POLAND
2. SUBJECT: (U) [REDACTED] Attempted Recruitment for Polish Intelligence Service
3. ISC NUMBER: [REDACTED]
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: August 1971
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Hannover, Germany 15 December 1971
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION
7. SOURCE: [REDACTED]
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 1347 72 (5004-02)
9. DATE OF REPORT: 8 February 1972
10. NO. OF PAGES: 3
11. REFERENCES: SICR: U-GEF 60082 DIRM: 6B7
12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group, APO New York 09108
13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [REDACTED] EUGENE KELLEY, JR. COL, MI Commanding

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

RECD DS-4CZ 31 MAR 1972

15. SUMMARY: [REDACTED] This [REDACTED] deals with an attempted recruitment for the Polish Intelligence Service by a Major in the Polish Army.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

REPORT:

1. [REDACTED] Source

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
3-USAREUR
1-EUCOM
1-VII Corps, w/o Incl
1-ACSI, w/o Incl
1-66th MI Gp, 430th MI Det, w/o Incl
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det, w/o Incl
1-OSI, w/o Incl

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP-1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

0319

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

1 Encl:

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(7)(D)

20241039L
20246039L

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 1147 72
PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES
ORIGINATOR
66th MI Group,
APO New York 09106

(Leave Blank)

2. (b) [REDACTED] Attempted recruitment as agent
of the Polish Intelligence Service in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 1347 72
PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES
ORIGINATOR
66th MI Group,
APO New York 09103

(Leave Blank)

3. (S)

Description of the Polish major

4. (U) This information

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

0321

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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5 USC 552 (b) (1)

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Page(s) 322-331

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Page(s) 332-338

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CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(Classification and Control Markings)

523G

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1. COUNTRY: POLAND	8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 219 0681 71 (5004-03)
2. SUBJECT: (S) Attempted Recruitment by the SB	9. DATE OF REPORT: 29 November 1971
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: July 1971	11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B7 SICR: U-GEF-G0482
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Duesseldorf, Germany 1 November 1971	12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group, APO New York 09108
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION	13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]
7. SOURCE: [REDACTED]	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: Robert E. Postma EUGENE KELLEY, JR COL, MI Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

1. (S) [REDACTED] The enclosed information concerning the attempted recruitment of [REDACTED] as an intelligence service informer. Source was approached by an agent, [REDACTED]

2. (U) This information [REDACTED]

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: 1-DIA 3-USAREUR, w/o Incl 1-EUCOM, w/o Incl 1-VII Corps, w/o Incl 1-ACSI, w/o Incl 1-66th MI Gp, 430th MI Det, w/o Incl 1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det, w/o Incl 1-OSI, w/o Incl	17. DOWNGRADING DATA: GROUP-1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION 0339	18. ENCLOSURE DATA: 1 Enclosure: 1. [REDACTED]
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CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

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NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 340-343

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(Classification and Control Markings)

547G

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1. COUNTRY: POLAND	8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 219 0595 71 (5004-07)
2. SUBJECT: (U) Recruiting Attempts of the Polish State Security Organs Among Resettlers	9. DATE OF REPORT: 26 November 1971
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 3 ZAC18367
	11. REFERENCES: SICR: U-GEF-G0482 DIRM: 6E7; 1C2
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: June 1971	12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Gp, APO NY 09406
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Nuernberg, Germany 29 September 1971	13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: Robert E. Foster EUGENE KELLEY, JR. COL, MI Commanding
7. SOURCE: [REDACTED]	

15. SUMMARY: This [REDACTED] concerns attempts by the Polish State Security to recruit favors from among ethnic Germans who are requesting resettlement.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

REPORT:

1. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] Background Information

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:
- 1-DIA
 - 3-USAREUR
 - 1-EUCOM w/o encl
 - 1-USAF w/o encl
 - 1-V Corps w/o encl
 - 1-VII Corps w/o encl
 - 1-EEIC w/o encl
 - 1-66th MI Gp, 430th MID w/o encl
 - 1-66th MI Gp, 766th MID w/o encl
 - 1-SF Det (Abn) Eur w/o encl
 - 1-USASPD w/o encl
 - 1-CINCPAC w/o encl
 - 1-OSI w/o encl

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:
1 Enclosure: [REDACTED]

0344

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396
1 SEP 62

17 DEC 1971

REC'D DS-4C2

242

X45313-PL
242464-PL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 219 0595 71
PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES
ORIGINATOR
66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108

(Leave Blank)

3. (S)  of Resettlement Efforts

Recruiting Attempt in the Course

4. (S) 

Appeal and Approval

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

DD FORM 1 SEP 62 1396c

0345
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(Classification and Control Markings)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

REPORT NO. 2 219 0595 71
PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES
ORIGINATOR
66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108

(Classification and Control Markings)

(Leave Blank)

5. (U) Personal Notes on Source

During the questioning Source was asked several times about approaching attempts by the State Security; he always gave divergent answers. Only at the end of the questioning was he provoked by an incidentally placed question and he admitted the above described recruiting attempt. It is assumed that Source did not fully disclose his knowledge because he feared that he would endanger the security of his relatives who still live in Poland. In particular, it was not possible to get a useful personal description of his interviewer. It can be gathered from Source's statements that there are full reasons that other ethnic Germans, who wanted to resettle, were approached for the same purpose. Source could or did not want to give more details in this respect.

6. (U) This information

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

0316

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

DD FORM 1396c
1 SEP 82

(Classification and Control Markings)

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

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Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

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DELETED PAGE(S)
NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 347-353

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

524A

This report contains unprocessed information.

Plans and/or policies should not be evaluated

or modified solely on the basis of this report.

HG-0195-71

(Classification and Control Markings)

1. COUNTRY: POLAND
2. SUBJECT: Attempted Recruitment of Resettlement Applicant Intelligence Mission
3. DATE OF REPORT: 15 November 1971
4. NO. OF PAGES: 3
5. REFERENCES: SICR: U-GEF-G0482
DIRM: 6B7a

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

6. DATE OF INFORMATION: June 1971
7. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Hamburg, Germany 11 October 1971
8. EVALUATION: SOURCE 2 INFORMATION 6
9. SOURCE: [REDACTED]
10. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108
11. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]
12. APPROVING AUTHORITY: EUGENE KELLEY, JR.
COL, MI
Commanding

13. SUMMARY:
(S) This report contains information on the attempted recruitment of Source by a presumed member of the Polish Intelligence Service to perform intelligence missions in West Germany after his legal resettlement. Although recruitment attempt took place in 1966, it is possibly significant that Source was never recontacted.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

REPORT

1. Source

14. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR
1-DIA
3-USAREUR
1-EUCOM
1-V Corps
1-VII Corps
1-ACSI
1-66th MI Gp, 430th MI Det
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det
1-USASPD
1-OSI
5-
3-CCFFA
10-BSIU(G)
1-
(Cont in Block 17)

17. DOWNGRADING DATA
GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:
None

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

17 DEC 1971

REC'D DS-402

237

24246 PL

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 219 0381 71
PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES
ORIGINATOR 66th MI Gp
APO NY 09108

2. ~~(S)~~ Decision to Apply for Resettlement

[REDACTED]

3. ~~(S)~~ Summons to Appear in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. ~~(S)~~ Attempted Recruitment by Polish Intelligence Service

[REDACTED]

0355

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
(Classification and Control Markings)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPORT NO. 2 219 0381 71
PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES
ORIGINATOR 66th MI Gp
APO NY 09108

(Classification and Control Markings)

(Leave Blank)

5. (S) Nervous Breakdown of Source

COMMENT

(U) Source was friendly and very cooperative.

However, Source did not contradict himself. Although he was questioned closely on his place of employment, Source had been so disinterested in his work that he was unable to provide any information worth reporting.

0356

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL

DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)
5 USC 552 (b) (1)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

523G

This report contains unprocessed information.

Plans and/or policies should not be evolved

or modified solely on the basis of this report.

DU-1153-71

1. COUNTRY: POLAND
2. SUBJECT: (U) Employment of Polish Truck Drivers by Polish Intelligence for Trips to the West
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: August 1971
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Duesseldorf, Germany 26 October 1971
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION
7. SOURCE:
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 219 0020 71 (5004-03)
9. DATE OF REPORT: 15 November 1971
10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
11. REFERENCES: SICR: U-GEF-G0482 DIRM: 6B6
12. ORIGINATOR:
13. PREPARED BY:
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: EUGENE KELLER, JR., COL, MI Commanding

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

14 DEC 1971

REC'D DS-482

15. SUMMARY:
1. (U) This information

(Leave Blank)

491

2. (U) This information

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

602400 } PL
202320 }

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR

(DL)
2-USAREUR
1-EUCOM w/o encl
1-USAFE w/o encl
1-V Corps w/o encl
1-VII Corps w/o encl
1-EEIC w/o encl
1-66th MI Gp, 430th MID
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MID w/o encl
1-SF Det (Abn) Eur w/o encl
1-USASPD w/o encl
1-CINCPAC w/o encl
1-OSI w/o encl

17. DOWNGRADING DATA

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

0357

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

1 Enclosure:

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

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Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

5 USC 552 (b) (1) 5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

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Page(s) 358-362

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

528G

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.
MZ-1556-71

1. COUNTRY: POLAND (U)	8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 9536 71 (5004-06)	
2. SUBJECT: (U) [REDACTED] Polish State Security Service Recruiting Attempt	9. DATE OF REPORT: 10 November 1971	
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 2	
	11. REFERENCES: 5 USC 552 (b) (6)	SICR: U-GEF-GO482 DIRM: 6B7; 6C; 6A2
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: June 1971	12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Gp, APC NY 0910	
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Mainz, Germany 15 September 1971	13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED] E. Schult	
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [REDACTED] EUGENE KELLEY, JR. COL, MI Commanding	
7. SOURCE: [REDACTED]		

15. SUMMARY: (U) [REDACTED] During [REDACTED] and at the time of application for resettlement from Poland to West Germany [REDACTED] a member of the Polish State Security Service at [REDACTED] made attempts to recruit Source. This report deals with these attempts and with the person [REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

REPORT:

1. [REDACTED] Source

At [REDACTED] Source made a trip to East Germany; the State Security made attempts to recruit Source for cooperation. Source refused. On resettlement to West Germany he was again approached by the State Security. [REDACTED]

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
3-USAREUR
1-EUCOM w/o encl
1-USAF w/o encl
1-V Corps w/o encl
1-VII Corps w/o encl
1-EEIC w/o encl
1-State Dept w/o encl
1-66th MI Gp, 430th MID w/o encl
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MID w/o encl
1-SF Det (Abn) Eur w/o encl
1-USASPD w/o encl
1-CINCPAC w/o encl
1-OSI w/o encl

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

0363

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18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

1 Enclosure: [REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (1)
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

REC'D DS-4C2 06 DEC 1971

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201310
201800
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 9536 71
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
ORIGINATOR
66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108

2. (S) [REDACTED] State Security Recruiting Attempts
in [REDACTED]

(Leave Blank)

The State Security Office is located on the 3d and 4th floors of the district police building in [REDACTED]

3. (U) This information [REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

0364

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(Classification and Control Markings)

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

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- ☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.
- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 365-367

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

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Page(s) 368-374

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

5200

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report. Z-1507-71

1. COUNTRY: POLAND
2. SUBJECT: (U) [REDACTED]
Approach by Polish State Security Service
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. REPORT NUMBER: 2-218 7694 71 (5004-D6)
5. DATE OF REPORT: 24 September 1971
6. NO. OF PAGES: 3
7. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B7
8 USC 552 (b) (6)

9. DATE OF INFORMATION: February 1971
10. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108
11. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Mainz, Germany
13 August 1971
12. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION
13. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [REDACTED]
LUGENE KELLEY, JR.
COL, MI
Commanding

14. SUMMARY: [REDACTED] (Leave Blank)
[REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D) 5 USC 552 (b) (1)

REPORT:

1. [REDACTED] Source

DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:
1-111
3-OSRMR
1-DCOM w/o encl
1-V Corps w/o encl
1-VII Corps w/o encl
1-ACSI w/o encl
1-66th MI Gp, CI Div w/o encl
1-OSI w/o encl

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
0275

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:
1 Enclosure: [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

REC'D DS-4C2 13 OCT 1971

275

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 7694 71
PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES
ORIGINATOR
66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108

2. ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] Interrogation of Source's Wife
by a Western Agent During a Visit to West Germany

(Leave Blank)

3. ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] Source's Trip to West Germany

4. ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] Application for Emigration and
the Consequences

5. ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] First Approach on [REDACTED]

0376

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396c
SEP 42

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

CONTINUATION SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 7694 71
PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES
ORIGINATOR
66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108

(Leave Blank)

6. (S) [REDACTED] The Second Approach of [REDACTED]

7. (U) This information [REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

0377

CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(Classification and Control Markings)

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

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5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

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Page(s) 378-383

601120 - PL
202320 - PL

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

528F

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(Classification and Control Markings)

1. COUNTRY: POLAND
(U)
2. SUBJECT: (U) SB Attempt to Recruit Ethnic German for Assignment to West Germany
3. ISC NUMBER: 5 USC 552 (b) (1)
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: April 1971
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Mainz, Germany
2 September 1971
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION
7. SOURCE: [REDACTED]
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 8664 71 (5004-06)
9. DATE OF REPORT: 21 September 1971
10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 7B6 ZA 41836
12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108
13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [Signature]
EUGENE KELLY, JR
COL, MI
Commanding

REC'D DS-4C2 13 OCT 1971

15. SUMMARY:
1. (U) [REDACTED] Source
[REDACTED]
2. (U) [REDACTED] Information
[REDACTED]
3. (U) This information [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D) 5 USC 552 (b) (1)

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:
1-DIA
3-USARUR
1-EUCOM w/o encl
3-USAFE w/o encl
1-V Corps w/o encl
1-VII Corps w/o encl
1-EEIC w/o encl
1-66th MI Gp, CI Div w/o encl
1-66th MI Gp, Spec Coll Div w/o encl
1-SF DET (Abn) Eur w/o encl
1-USASPD w/o encl
1-CINCPACAF w/o encl
1-AIU-Westport w/o encl
1-OSI w/o encl

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
[REDACTED]
0384
CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(Classification and Control Markings)

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:
[REDACTED]

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

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- ☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

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- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 385-388

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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(Classification and Control Markings)

B17400 (G)

This report contains unprocessed information.

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or modified solely on the basis of this report.

B174-378/71

1. COUNTRY: POLAND/WEST GERMANY
 2. SUBJECT: Prize Contest Possibly Sponsored by PIS (U)
 3. ISC NUMBER:
 4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 11 August 1971
 5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Munich, Germany
 10 September 1971
 6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 2
 7. SOURCE: See Comments
 8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 2875 71
 9. DATE OF REPORT: 13 September 1971
 10. NO. OF PAGES: 2
 11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B7
 IR: 2 212 2196 69
 12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group
 13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]
 14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: *E. M. Kelly, DAC*
 EUGENE KELLEY JR
 COL, MI
 Commanding

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

15. SUMMARY: (U) This report consists of a translation of a German language prize contest announcement sponsored by the Committee for Radio and Television Affairs, Polish Radio and Television, Foreign Broadcasts Department, in WARSAW, which was distributed by mail to residents of West Germany and various West German leftist publications.

(U) On 11 August 1971, the Committee for Radio and Television Affairs, Polish Radio and TV, Foreign Broadcasts Department, in WARSAW, mailed approximately 1,350 copies of a circular announcing a special prize contest to its listeners in West Germany. Copies of the circular were also sent to various leftist publications with the request to give it wide publication. The translation of the German language text of the circular follows:

"FORUM EUROPE 1971"

Under this motto, the Polish Radio in cooperation with the radio stations of Bulgaria, the GDR, Rumania, the USSR, the CSSR, and Hungary is organizing a prize contest. You can win:

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
 2-USAREUR
 1-EUCOM
 1-ACSI-CIPC
 1-OSI
 1-USASAE
 1-66th MI Gp, AEUTMI-OA-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
 NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
 DOD DIR 5200.10

0389

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
 DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

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18

242464-PL

RECD DS-4C2 13 OCT 1971

ZAF 18367

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED
 ON JUN 17 1998
 BY USAINSCOM/FOIPA
 AUTH: Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 212 2875 71
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
ORIGINATOR 66th MI Group

(Leave Blank)

1. A ten day trip throughout Poland.
2. Numerous valuable prizes and souvenirs.

In order to participate in the drawing of prizes, the following questions must be answered:

1. What is your response to the proposal of the socialist countries to call a conference on European security and what do you expect from this conference?
2. Which personalities in your country have distinguished themselves in pursuing the matter of peace and in what manner?

The answers must be mailed by 31 December 1971 (date of postmark is decisive) marked "Prize Contest" to "Polskie Radio (Polish Radio), WARSAW-1, Box 46, Poland.

The results of the contest will be announced on 31 January 1972 in all German language broadcasts of Polish Radio.

The trips to Poland won by the top winners will be made at a time arranged by the Polish Radio Service.

Warsaw, October 1971

Wieslaw GRUSZECKI
Chief of Productions."

COMMENTS (S):

1. The information is submitted because hostile intelligence services have in the past used the "contest" scheme where top prizes consisted of trips behind the iron curtain for recruitment operations. We have last reported on a similar contest ran by Polish Radio and TV in IR 2 212 2196 69.

2. Information contained in this report was received from [REDACTED] No further details available.

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

0390

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

88H, 003, 16 Apr

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

609G A-104-00
This report contains unprocessed information.
Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.
609-136/71 R/M

(Classification and Control Markings)

1. COUNTRY: POLAND 8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 2000 71

2. SUBJECT: PIS Modus Operandi (U) 9. DATE OF REPORT: 30 March 1971

10. NO. OF PAGES: 2

3. ISC NUMBER:

11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6C

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 20 February 1971

12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Munich, Germany
29 March 1971

13. PREPARED BY:

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 2

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: *Robert W. Williams*
ROBERT W. WILLIAMS
COL, MI
Commanding

7. SOURCE: See Comments

15. SUMMARY:

(U) This report contains information on modus operandi of PIS in a recruitment attempt of an ethnic German residing in [redacted] who applied for repatriation to West Germany to include recruitment inducements and pressures employed.

(Leave Blank)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

0391

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CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 212 2000 71

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

ORIGINATOR 66th MI Group

(Leave Blank)

COMMENT (C): This is the first report received by this office indicating that PIS is trying to recruit ethnic Germans applying for repatriation to the FRG under the current relaxed procedures. The system of pressures is not unusual and could work to the advantage of PIS in those cases where the approached ethnic Germans become impatient and agree to cooperate in return for immediate repatriation. Whether such personnel will carry out their assigned missions once they are in the safe area of the FRG will depend on whether PIS will still retain means of pressure against them (i. e. family members remaining in Poland). Information contained in this report was received from [REDACTED] Original source cannot be contacted. Data obtained through the particular collection media used is usually highly reliable. No further details available.

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- ☐ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

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- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

- ☒ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 393-396

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT		
<p>NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.</p>		<p>231-70342</p> <p>CONFIDENTIAL</p> <p>(Classification and Control Markings)</p>
<p>505A</p> <p>This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.</p>		
1. COUNTRY: POLAND	8. REPORT NUMBER: 274 0253 73 (224 04)	
2. SUBJECT: (U) Border Controls and Restrictions, POLAND	9. DATE OF REPORT: 24 September 1970	
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 2	
	11. REFERENCES: 624	1745
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 4 Sep 70 6 Sep 70	12. ORIGINATOR: 430th MID APC 09108	5 USC 552 (b) (6)
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Munich, GFR 8 Sep 70	13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]	
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE C INFORMATION 3	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [REDACTED] MAJ MI	
7. SOURCE: 22130057	<p>Paul P. Jones Jr. PAUL A. ILL, LTC MI</p>	
15. SUMMARY: (U) This report provides information pertaining to border controls		(Leave Blank)
<p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D) 5 USC 552 (b) (1)</p>		
<p>1. (U) Source reported the following information on border control measures in POLAND:</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>a. [REDACTED] upon arrival at the control point, travelers' passports are surrendered to an official, clad in dark blue uniform with visor cap. After passports are checked and stamped, the passports are returned and the travelers are directed to another building to exchange currency. Currency exchange is based on the number of days that the traveler intends to spend in the country.</p>		
16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:	17. DOWNGRADING DATA:	18. ATTACHMENT DATA:
<p>1 - DIA(DIACO)</p> <p>2 - DCSI, USAREUR</p> <p>1 - ACSI</p> <p>1 - USAIRR</p> <p>1 - USEUCOM</p> <p>1 - USASAE</p> <p>1 - ETC, USAREUR</p>	<p>DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS</p> <p>NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED</p> <p>DOD DIR 5200.10</p>	<p>NONE</p>
<p>0397</p> <p>CONFIDENTIAL</p>		

CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 704 0253 70

PAGE 2 OF 2

PAGES

ORIGINATOR 430th MID

APD 0-108

(Leave Blank)

Source was required to exchange AMS 400 per day into Polish Zlotys. A Currency Exchange Slip is provided to the traveler, who then returns to the same building where the passport was initially checked and stamped. At this time, the passport is surrendered to another border official. For an unexplained reason, Source was kept waiting approximately one (1) hour before his passport was returned. Source was then required to have his green insurance card checked by two (2) female officials, also in blue uniforms, after which he was permitted to proceed on his trip.

b. There were no travel restrictions imposed on Source and he was able to travel freely in POLAND, with the exception of restricted areas in the vicinity of Berne (XV0170/5332N-0163E), and Swietoslow (152712/5158N-2040E), POLAND.

c. At the Jakuszyce border control point, travelers are required to park their vehicles, enter a long building occupied at one end by Polish border officials, and the other by Czech officials. Travelers surrender their passports to a Polish official in a dark blue uniform, who checks and stamps the passport. The currency exchange certificate provided is given to the official. At this point, Source was directed to another room, occupied by two officials, one (1) male and one (1) female, also clad in dark blue uniforms. The female official requested Source to accompany her to his vehicle where she requested him to open the luggage compartment and withdraw the smaller of two (2) suitcases carried by Source, for inspection. Prior to leaving the vehicle to return to the building for the inspection, the male official arrived and directed Source to take both suitcases into the building for inspection. Both suitcases were thoroughly checked to include the inner linings and contents. The male official then directed Source to another room where Source was requested to empty his pockets and turn them inside out. Each item from Source's pockets was examined, including Source's coin case. Source was then instructed to remove his sweater. The official conducted a search of Agent's body, feeling for concealed articles under the clothing. The official then requested Source to accompany him to Agent's vehicle where he checked the items in the luggage compartment, rear seat, and engine compartment. Items in luggage compartment and interior of vehicle, to include spare tire, radio, foodstuffs, camera bag were withdrawn from vehicle. The border official failed to check the glove compartment of vehicle. Following the search, Source was permitted to proceed to the Czech side of the border.

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

ON 17 JUN 1998

BY USAINSCOM FOU/PA

And Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

0398

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

2A 014 35

20AUG70/MRJENKINS/ID/3100

0900

ICDSO-O-E

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

AUG 24 1970

CIA
b1
b3

Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
USAREUR and Seventh Army
ATTN: AEAGB-CI (SO)
APO New York 09403

(U) Attached [REDACTED] forwarded for your information and dissemination as you deem appropriate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl.
as

IRWIN R. GAY
LTC, MI
Acting Assistant Adjutant General

REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL
ON Jun 17, 98
BY CDR USA/SCOM/PO/PO
AUTH: [REDACTED]

0399

4745-70

3 - 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECORD COPY/ICDSO-O-E

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

0300

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (S)

REFERENCES: [REDACTED]

BACKGROUND: [REDACTED]

DISCUSSION: (S) Even though ACSI is indicated as addressee on CIA report and may forward a copy of the document to USAREUR, USAINTC can strengthen rapport with USAREUR by forwarding same. CEB has no need of document as entire content concerns [REDACTED]

ACTION TAKEN: (U) As indicated in instant ltr.

ACTION OFFICER: (U) Jenkins, GL, CEB, OOD, DSO *ggj*

COORDINATION: (U) None

REVIEWER: (U) ROBINSON, T.R. C/CEB, OOD, DSO

*CIA
b1
b3*

REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL
ON 1794098
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

0400

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~~SECRET~~

4745-70
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- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 401-403

affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL

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(Classification and Control Markings)

1. COUNTRY: WEST BERLIN

022 8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 4772 65

2. SUBJECT: (b) (6) Attempted Recruitment by Polish Intelligence Service

9. DATE OF REPORT: 17 August 1965

10. NO. OF PAGES: 4

3. ISC NUMBER:

11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6C, 6B6a, 6B7a, 7A6

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 20 June 1965

12. ORIGINATOR: C&I Bn, 513th INTC Group

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACO: Oberursel, Germany
15 July 1965

13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

7. SOURCE: [REDACTED]

Dean M. Carlson
DEAN M. CARLSON
Major, AIS
Operations Officer

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

15. SUMMARY:

(b) (6) This report describes the method used by personnel of the Polish Intelligence Service to recruit [REDACTED] for espionage activities in West BERLIN.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

REPORT

1. (b) (6) Background

[REDACTED]

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

3-USAREUR, DCSI
2-USEUCOM, J2
3-USA/SPD
2-10th SF Gp (Abn)
1-AF LnO w/C&I Bn
4-Op Br 513th INTC Gp
1-Op Br 513th INTC Gp ATTN:OREN
1-C/R 513th INTC Gp
5- [REDACTED]
10-BSSO

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

None

0404

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CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 4772 65

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGE

ORIGINATOR C&I Bn 513th INTC G

(Leave Blank)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

2. ~~(C)~~ Initial Approach by Recruiting Agent

INFORMATION SCHEDULE

0405

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CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 4772 65
PAGE 3 OF 4 PA
ORIGINATOR C&I Bn 513th INTC

3. ~~(S)~~ Meeting with TULOCZKO and Polish Agent Handler in E BERLIN

(Leave Blank)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

0406

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CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 4772 65

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGE

ORIGINATOR C&I Bn 513th INTC GJ

4. ~~(S)~~ Source Avoids Mission

(Leave Blank)

COMMENTS

~~(S)~~ Source

(U) This interrogation was conducted by [REDACTED]

COMMENTS OF APPROVING OFFICER

(U) THIS IS RAW/UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

0407

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

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Page(s) 408-412

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Page(s) 413 - 416

~~Confidential~~

Kate in P19

ZB018367
2408

POLAND

044

(U) Recruitment Attempt by
Polish Intelligence

KA 1485

2212337665

8 June 1965

Two

DIRM 6B7a

Dec 64 - May 65

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

66th INTC Gp

Kassel, Germany
20/24 May 65
F

6

E. A. Allen, Capt, MC
for LLOYD R. SALISBURY
Colonel, AIS
Commanding

This report relates an attempted recruitment of a Polish
emigrant to GFR by Polish Intelligence.

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

1. Background:

2. Notification for Interview:

- 1 - DIA (DIAA-3)
- 1 - USARMA POLAND
- 2 - USEUCOM, J2
- 2 - Spec Pub Det
- 2 - 10th Spec Forces Gp
- 4 - [REDACTED]
- 3 - BSSO
- 3 - SDECE
- 1 - USAFE
- 4 - 513th INTC Gp
- 1 - Seventh Army
- 1 - OC Div, 66th INTC Gp

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.
DOD DIR 5200.10

0417

~~Confidential~~

~~Confidential~~

2212337665
2 2
66th INTC Gp
KA 1485

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

3. ~~(S)~~ Interview:

4. ~~(S)~~ Future Contacts:

5. ~~(S)~~ Description of Captain:

COMMENTS: ~~(S)~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

0418

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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CONFIDENTIAL

(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: PO 022 S. REPORT NUMBER: 2218183665

2. SUBJECT: (U) Mission of Polish Intelligence Agent Dispatched to Western Countries 3. DATE OF REPORT: 19 April 1965

4. ISC NUMBER: 10. NO. OF PAGES: 8

11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B7a, 6B8
5 USC 552 (b) (6)

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: July 1964 12. ORIGINATOR: C&I Bn, 513th INTC Gp

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Oberursel, Germany 2 February 1965 13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6 14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: Jean M. Carlson Capt, AIS
for ERNEST V. ZURETTI
Major, AIS
Operations Officer

7. SOURCE: [REDACTED]

15. SUMMARY:

(U) This report deals with the recruitment method and missions assigned by Polish Intelligence to a legal traveler from Poland to England and West Germany. It gives information on the EEI's required for a low-level intelligence agent, and shows attempts at deception made at this installation during initial phases of interrogation.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

REPORT

1. (U) Introduction

[REDACTED]

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA (DIAA-3)
3-USAREUR, DCSI
1-USARMA, Poland
2-USEUCOM, J2
2-USA/SPD
2-10th SF Gp (Abn)
1-AF LNO w/C&I Bn
4-S3, 513th INTC Gp
1-S3, 513th INTC Gp, ATTN: OREN
1-C/R, 513th INTC Gp
8-S3, 513th INTC Gp,
ATTN: NTR Sec, Rec Br

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

None

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CONTINUATION SHEET

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REPORT NO. 2218183665
PAGE 2 OF 8 PAGES
ORIGINATOR C&I Bn, 513th INTC Gp

(Leave Blank)

a. [REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED]

c. [REDACTED]

d. [REDACTED]

e. [REDACTED]

f. [REDACTED]

g. [REDACTED]

h. [REDACTED]

i. [REDACTED]

j. [REDACTED]

k. [REDACTED]

l. [REDACTED]

Because of the above listed discrepancies and inconsistencies, Source was turned over to an interrogator specializing in CI cases. Source gave his full name and other pertinent details and admitted to having several nicknames or aliases. At home he was called [REDACTED] the diminutive of his given name [REDACTED]. While in the Polish Army he was called by two names by his comrades, either [REDACTED] or, its diminutive, [REDACTED]. Source was not questioned on the above listed inconsistencies point by point, but was told that his whole story appeared to be a fabrication. Under direct questioning, Source admitted that he had been lying on the following points:

a. [REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED]

0420

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2218183665
PAGE 3 OF 8 PAGES
ORIGINATOR C&I Bn, 513th INTC G

(Leave Blank)

c. [REDACTED]

d. [REDACTED]

e. [REDACTED]

f. [REDACTED]

g. [REDACTED]

h. [REDACTED]

i. [REDACTED]

j. [REDACTED]

2. (C) Recruitment by Polish Intelligence

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0421

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2218183665

PAGE 4 of 8 PAGES

ORIGINATOR C&I Bn, 513th INTC Gp

(Leave Blank)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

3. ~~(c)~~ Requirements Levied on Source

0422

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CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO: 2218183665

PAGE 5

OF 8

PAGES

ORIGINATOR C&I Bn, 513th INTC Gp

(Leave Blank)

a. In Great Britain

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b. In West Germany

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

0423

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)
5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)
5 USC 552 (b) (1)

CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2218183665

PAGE 6 OF 8 PAGES

ORIGINATOR C&I Bn, 513th INTC Gp

(Leave Blank)

4. ~~(S)~~ Continuation of Briefing

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5. ~~(S)~~ EEI for

0424

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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5 USC 552 (b) (1)
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2218183665
PAGE 7 OF 8 PAGES
ORIGINATOR C&I Bn, 513th INTC Gr

(Leave Blank)

[REDACTED]

6. (c) Promises Made

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

7. (c) Signing of Obligation

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

0425

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

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
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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2218183665



PAGE 8 OF 8 PAGES
ORIGINATOR C&I Bn, 513th INTC Gp

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COMMENTS1. ~~(S)~~ Source2. ~~(S)~~ Remarks

b. Despite Source's alleged confession, it is felt that there remains a number of questions open which indicates that the reliability to be placed into this report is at the most, doubtful. In particular, the following questions remain:

(1) (2) (3) 

c. Interrogation was conducted by  with  acting as interpreter in the Polish language.

COMMENTS OF THE APPROVING OFFICER:

THIS IS RAW UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

0426

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

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Page(s)

427-434

COUNTRY: Poland

REPORT NO: HN-22-63

SUBJECT: Polish Security Service (UB) Information, SWINOUJSKIE (v) DATE OF REPORT: 21 February 1963

NO. OF PAGES: 46

DATE OF INFO: 20 November 1962

REFERENCES: ICD, D8a(5)(a)(CI)

DATE & PLACE ACQ: Hannover, Germany 7 February 1963

FROM: USA Element Hannover C&D Bn, 513th INTC Gp

EVALUATION: F-6

PREPARED BY: [REDACTED] 292/102

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

R-SERIES: 5 USC 552 (b) (6)

SUMMARY: (CONFIDENTIAL)

This report contains limited information on the modus operandi of the Polish Security Service (UB) in the SWINOUJSKIE area of Poland. It contains additionally names of former UB collaborators residing in the former US Zone of West Germany.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: 2 IRCD
4 Tech Resch Bn (P)
1 Mag Ctr, C&D Bn
1 Originator Files

Inclosures: None

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED;
DOD DIR 5200.10

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

0435

~~Confidential~~

HN-22-63

Page 2

SUBJ: Polish Security Service(UB) Information, SWINOUJSCIE (S)(U)

REPORT

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Once inside the building, Source was led into a cell-like room where he was interrogated for 4 to 5 hours by three men who identified themselves as members of the Polish Security Service (UB). During the interrogation, Source was vaguely threatened with imprisonment for anti-regime remarks which he had made, and his belt and shoe-laces were taken from him. Source, fearing for his personal safety and attempting to avoid imprisonment, offered to collaborate with the UB as a sign of his "support" of the regime. The offer was accepted, and Source was required to sign a commitment and was assigned a cover name: [REDACTED] At the same time, Source was given a general mission to report remarks and political convictions of the German populace and his co-workers.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

(S)(U)

(S)(U)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

0436

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE~~Confidential~~

~~Confidential~~

HM-22-63

Page 3

SUBJ: Polish Security Service (UB) Information, SWINOUJSCIE (S)(U)

After the first interrogation, Source was handled by a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] who made payments and gave further missions to Source. Amongst

numerous others, Source was ordered to report on the activities of the

following persons:

✓ a. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

✓ b. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

0437

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~Confidential~~

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (6) LAC

5 USC 552 (b) (6) LAC

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

~~Confidential~~

HN-22-63

Page 4

SUBJ: Polish Security Service (UB) Information, SUTKOWSCIE (S) (U)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

[REDACTED]

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

[REDACTED]

0438

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

[REDACTED]

~~Confidential~~

~~Confidential~~

HN-22-63

Page 5

SUBJ: Polish Security Service (UB) Information, STINOJSCIE ~~(S)~~ (U)

[REDACTED]

COMMENTS

1. ~~(S)~~ (U) Source

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

[REDACTED]

0439

~~Confidential~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

HN-22-63

~~Confidential~~

Page 6

2. (U) Remarks

a. Source also gave information which is contained in report

HN-21-63.

b. [REDACTED]

c. [REDACTED]

d. THIS IS RAW, UNEVALUATED INFORMATION.

R. L. Rinehart
R. L. RINEHART
OIC

~~Confidential~~

EXCLUDED FROM SCHEDULE

0440

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- ☐ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

- ☒ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S) NO DUPLICATION FEE FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 441-442

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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Page(s) 443-455

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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Page(s) 456-457

ORRIS

(Polish National Travel Agency)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REMARKS: Applicants to Poland are forwarded to SUBJ org.

(S)(1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

6-106-65-58 (23349)

Mentioned in

et al. For add info see card on

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0458

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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Page(s) 459-461

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Page(s) 462-477

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Page(s) 478-480

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DELETED PAGE(S) NO DUPLICATION FEE FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 481-493

66 283 906

ACSI-SC
ACSI

Possible Provocation Attempts Against USAFMA,
Warsaw, Poland (S) (u)
DSMCI

AUG 3 1961

Capt Rubard/Tde/73958

1. (S) (u) On 23 June 1961, during a 24-hour period, three Polish nationals came to the U.S. Embassy, Warsaw, and requested to see the U.S. Army Military Attache or his assistant. The first individual asked AFMA to aid him in an illegal crossing of the Polish border into Germany, stating that he thought AFMA would know how to get across the border illegally. The second individual handed AAFMA a letter in Polish concerning the alleged formation of a "Central Committee of the Polish Armed Organization for Freedom," which is to fight "oppression by the Communist regime and lack of true freedom for the Polish people." Attached to the letter was a note giving procedures for a clandestine contact between AAFMA and members of the alleged resistance organization. The third individual claimed to be a construction worker, and offered to furnish the AFMA with plans of 130 concrete bunkers around Warsaw if they could meet in a "safer place" outside the Embassy. In each case AFMA refused to make any commitments or further contacts and the individuals departed. AFMA immediately reported the approaches to the U.S. Ambassador, who recommended that AFMA refuse to see any such visitors for a period of several days.

2. (S) (u) These contacts appear to be a rather clumsy attempt on the part of the Polish Intelligence Services to entrap AFMA and provide the basis for a possible PNG action in retaliation for the neutralization of Irvin C. Scarbeck, former Second Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw (who was furnishing information to Polish Intelligence) and the defection in January 1961 of MARKSMAN, a former UB staff officer.

(sgd) Walter C. Wickboldt

WALTER C. WICKBOLDT
Colonel, GS

Acting Director of Security, Mapping
and Combat Intelligence

0492

REMOVED FROM
CIAS FILES

064675

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON AUG 11 1999
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

104012

POWER
NOT

800000

104 1264

ACSI-SC

MEMO FOR RECORD: (27 July 1961) — ~~SECRET/NOFORN~~ (4)

SUBJECT: Possible Provocation Attempts Against USARMA, Warsaw, Poland (Z)

CURRENT: Inst DF informs ACSI of possible provocation attempts by Polish Intelligence Services against USARMA, Warsaw.

BACKGROUND: USARMA, Warsaw, Poland, per ltr S-1-61 OARMA 274/6, subj: Reports of Incidents (U), dtd 26 June 1961, reported that on 23 June 1961, during 2½-hour period, three Polish nationals contacted USARMA and attempted to involve ARMA in intelligence activities. The approaches appear to be an attempt by PIS to entrap ARMA and form the basis for possible future PNG action. ARMA made no commitments and informed U.S. Ambassador, Warsaw, of incidents.

STATUS: Closed.

RATIONALE: To inform ACSI of possible PIS provocation attempts against ARMA, Warsaw.

DELAY: None.

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None.

COORDINATION: None required.

Action Officer Time: 1 hr
Typist Time: 2 hr

0493

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON AUG 11 1999
BY USAINSCOM FOUFA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

27 JUL 61



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

Mr. John Young
251 West 89th St., Suite 6E
New York, NY 10024

June 16, 2005

Request No.: GR 02-111
Subject: Poland Intelligence Services MO
ZF400226W

Dear Requester:

While processing your Freedom of Information-Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, Department of the Army located FBI information in their records. This material was referred to the FBI for direct response to you.

Enclosed are copies of the referred material. Deletions have been made pursuant to Title 5, United States Code, Section(s) 552/552a as noted below. See the enclosed form for an explanation of these exemptions.

Section 552

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(A)
<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(B)
<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(3) _____	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(C)
_____	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(D)
_____	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(E)
_____	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(F)
<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(8)
<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(5)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(9)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(6)	

Section 552a

<input type="checkbox"/> (d)(5)
<input type="checkbox"/> (j)(2)
<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(1)
<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(2)
<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(3)
<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(4)
<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(5)
<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(6)
<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(7)

The documents responsive to your request were previously processed for another requester. In order to provide the information you requested as soon as possible, we have released FBI information as it was originally processed. In the event you desire to appeal any withholding, please refer, in addition to the FOIPA (Request No.) number assigned to this request, to FOIPA number 439083 (Army 833F-98), where the original processing is maintained.

You may appeal any denials by writing to the Co-Director, Office of Information and Privacy, United States Department of Justice, Flag Building, Suite 570, Washington, D.C., 20530, within sixty days of the date of your letter. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA number assigned to your request so that it may easily be identified.

Sincerely yours,

David M. Hardy
Section Chief,
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Records Management Division

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b) (1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
- (b) (2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b) (3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b) (4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b) (5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b) (6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b) (7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b) (8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b) (9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d) (5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j) (2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k) (1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k) (2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k) (3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k) (4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k) (5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k) (6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k) (7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Freedom of Information / Privacy Acts

Release

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

Serial Description ~ COVER SHEET 08/06/1986

Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 5

Page 3 ~ b1

Page 4 ~ b1

Page 5 ~ b1

Page 10 ~ b1

Page 11 ~ b1

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X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X for this Page X
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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR



2A018367

CONFIDENTIAL

USAINTC

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

EXPLCITATION OF NON-DIPLOMATIC AGENCIES
AND FIRMS OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES FOR
ESPIONAGE AND SUBVERSIVE PURPOSES

Under date of February 17, 1971, there was submitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Special Committee a survey of the use of certain non-diplomatic agencies of the communist countries of the Warsaw Pact for espionage and subversive purposes.

Certain of these agencies and firms were specifically named as examples. It was stated that the absence of a specific agency or firm of a communist country in the various listings should not lead one to conclude that such agency or firm is not being used or has not been used as cover for intelligence personnel.

In response to the request of the NATO Office of Security NOS(71)192 dated March 15, 1971, there are listed various non-diplomatic agencies and firms of the Warsaw Pact countries giving their addresses and the number of nationals of the country concerned who are employed at their establishments in the United States. The number of Americans employed is shown in parentheses immediately below the figure for nationals of the country concerned.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Employees</u>
Bulgaria	
New York City	
Bulgarian Telegraph Agency	1
445 East 86th Street	
Balkantourist (Travel Agency)	1
50 East 42nd Street	

CONFIDENTIAL

0393

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267/PLS/LL
ON 5/2/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RE: EXPLOITATION OF NON-DIPLOMATIC AGENCIES AND FIRMS
OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES FOR ESPIONAGE AND SUBVERSIVE
PURPOSES

Czechoslovakia

Washington, D. C.

Rude Pravo (News) 1
501 13th Street, N.W.
Czechoslovak Airlines 1
1725 K Street, N.W.

New York City

Czechoslovak News Agency 2
330 East 46th Street
Czechoslovak Airlines 6
545 5th Avenue
Czechoslovak Travel Information Office 4
10 East 40th Street

Hungary

Washington, D. C.

Hungarian News Agency, MTI 1
10827 Bucknell Drive, Wheaton,
Maryland

Magyar Nemzet (News) 1
12000 Old Georgetown Road, Rockville,
Maryland

Nepszabadsag (News) 1
11215 Oak Leaf Drive, Silver Spring,
Maryland

(The above addresses are the residences
of the correspondents.)

New York City

Permanent Correspondent of Hungarian 1
Radio at the United Nations

Poland

Washington, D. C.

Polish Press Agency (PAP) 1
Room 928, National Press Building
Trybuna Ludu (News) 1
Room 928, National Press Building

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RE: EXPLOITATION OF NON-DIPLOMATIC AGENCIES AND FIRMS
OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES FOR ESPIONAGE AND SUBVERSIVE
PURPOSES

New York City	
Orbis (Travel Office)	1
500 5th Avenue	
Polish Airlines (LOT)	2
500 5th Avenue	
Gdynia America Line (Shipping)	5
115 Broadway	(22) Americans
Pekao Trading Corporation (Commercial)	2
225 Park Avenue South	(31) Americans
Cepelia (Polish Art Center)	3
63 East 57th Street	(11) Americans
Polish Press Agency (PAP)	2
Room 360, Press Section,	
United Nations Secretariat	
Animex	3
International Board Sales, Inc.	2
Cetebe	1
Polish firms having representation in New York on special assignment.	
Romania	
Washington, D. C.	
Romanian News Agency	1
2727 29th Street, N.W.	
New York City	
Romanian Tourist Office	2
500 5th Avenue	
U.S.S.R.	
Washington, D. C.	
Tass News Agency	7
National Press Building	
Other correspondents:	
Izvestiya	1
Pravda	1
Radio Moscow	1
Selskaya Zhizn	1
Soviet Radio and TV	1
New York City	
Amtorg Trading Corporation	23
355 Lexington Avenue	(5) Americans

0395

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RE: EXPLOITATION OF NON-DIPLOMATIC AGENCIES AND FIRMS
OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES FOR ESPIONAGE AND SUBVERSIVE
PURPOSES

Intourist	7
45 East 49th Street	
Aeroflot	9
Pan American Terminal,	
John F. Kennedy International Airport	
Tass News Agency	14
50 Rockefeller Plaza	(14) Americans
Other correspondents:	
Economic Gazette	1
Izvestiya	1
Komsomolskaya Pravda	1
Moscow News	1
Novosti Press Agency	1
Pravda	3
Trud	1


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4 -

0396

~~SECRET~~

RE: POLISH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES




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b1



(S)

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- 3 -

~~SECRET~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

November 10, 1959

POLISH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

bi

(S)

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CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. **100-350264**

CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

011050

93) 6-2
000.2422

Date: August 14, 1951
To: Mr. Donald L. Nicholson, Chief
Division of Security
Office of Consular Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C.
From: John Edgar Hoover - Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Subject: POLISH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES
INTERNAL SECURITY - R AND FO

Recently a reliable informant furnished the Bureau with detailed instructions, which have been issued by the Polish Government to the Polish diplomatic establishments, regarding the handling of secret and confidential papers and information to prevent such information from penetrating to centers inimical to "People's Poland." The confidential informant of known reliability also furnished instructions governing the behavior of personnel of Polish diplomatic outposts in the case of arrest, search and interrogation.

There is attached a copy of each of the following documents:

1. Regulations. (These regulations went into effect in May, 1949.)
2. Directive. (This directive amends the regulations and went into effect in November, 1949.)
3. Decree. (This decree went into effect in October, 1949.)

Attachments

PERMANENT RECORD COPY
SURVEY SECTION

0196

14 Aug 51

Declassified BY 60267 uws/SC
1/17/2014

PIC 1 Enc 1

4. An Inspection Report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw. (This report was made early in 1951 and refers to the regulations of May, 1949.)

5. Instructions regarding the behavior of personnel in case of arrest, search and interrogation. (These instructions went into effect in February, 1949, and were reiterated to the Polish diplomatic posts in the United States in April, 1951.)

It is emphasized that this information was obtained from a highly delicate source of information, whose identity must be protected under all circumstances. These data are for your confidential information and should not be disseminated outside of your Department.

CC - Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Attention: Major General
Office of Special Operations

Attachments

b6

b7C

CC - Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Attachments

CC - Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Attachments

Attention: Chief, Intelligence Division

CC - Director of Special Investigations
Inspector General
Department of the Air Force
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Attachments

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

REGULATIONS

In the matter of handling secret and confidential papers.

1. (1) The secret papers are those which contain information of such a nature that they ought to be kept secret in the interest of the State. The documents classified as confidential are those which should be kept secret for reasons of the Service.

(2) The preservation of secrecy of the contents of documents classified as secret or confidential, is binding upon both parties, and third persons, as well as on all those who are not handling such documents directly. This applies to the personnel in the Central Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the Offices representing it abroad.
2. Every employee of the Central, as well as of the Offices abroad of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is bound on personal responsibility to keep secret the contents of the secret or confidential papers and to see that none of the unauthorized individuals have the access to, or the possession of, or a possibility of obtaining information about the contents of such documents.
3. (1) In classifying a document as to its secrecy or confidentiality (for the purpose of preserving its content secret), the party handling it shall be guided by the definition contained in the point #1 of these regulations.

(2) The secrecy or confidentiality of a document shall be determined by the party charged with its handling; final responsibility as to its proper classification shall rest with the party signing such a document.

(3) If the nature of the incoming correspondence should warrant, it can be declared secret.

- 1 -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/25/03 BY 60267/MS/ST

0197

PERMANENT RECORD COPY
SURVEY SECTION

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Incoming foreign language correspondence, bearing no classification, as to its secrecy or confidentiality, shall be examined by the chief of the organizational unit, or by an employee designated by him, for the purpose of determining its secret or confidential portent. Correspondence received as secret, or confidential, cannot be considered as public without the consent of the sender.

4. The handling of secret and confidential documents in the Ministry's Central Offices, as well as in the offices of its representative units abroad, is conducted according to general instructions on handling of the (paragraphs 2 and 3) general public records, with the following exceptions:
- (1) The secret and confidential documents shall be registered in a specially designated Record book; the deliveries of such documents shall be made by a person specially authorized for that function.
 - (2) Secret and confidential documents shall be kept in a light pink folder, to differentiate them from the general documents.
 - (3) Internal circulation of the secret and confidential papers shall be conducted in sealed envelopes, and may be delivered only upon the signature of the receiving party.
 - (4) The secret, or confidential documents may be transmitted to other organizational units within the Central Office of the Ministry, or other offices, upon the exclusive, written recommendation from the chief of the unit, to whose custody such documents were entrusted. The secret, or confidential documents sent out, or transmitted to other organizational unit, shall be addressed to the chief of that unit, and shall bear distinct indication that it is: "to be delivered in person." The chief of the organizational unit decides who of the employees in his unit shall have access to the secret and confidential documents. Releasing of secret, or confidential documents by the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is governed by special regulations.
 - (5) The Office of the Ministry shall release the secret and confidential documents to any official authorized by the chief of a Department, or an independent section, upon recording the date and the name of the authorized official to whom such documents were released.

(6) Every employee who has read the secret or confidential document, shall note thereon the date of reading, and his, or her name.

5. The preparation of the originals of the secret and confidential documents, as a rule, should not be typed in the general typing room. Upon the recommendation of the chief of the organizational unit, secret or confidential documents shall be written personally by the employee handling the matter, rather than by a typist. In cases when such confidential or secret documents must be typed, they shall be turned over to the typist without the precis. If the secret document is to be mimeographed, the responsible party must be present during the time of such an operation.

(1) The originals and copies of the secret and confidential papers are prepared only in such quantity, as is indicated by the distribution list noted on the rough copy of the document. The distribution list shall be limited to the absolute minimum, and each copy shall be individually numbered.

(2) The originals and copies of secret documents, shall be marked "Secret," or "Confidential" in the right corner, over the text.

(3) Throwing into waste basket of rough copies of confidential or secret documents, or of carbon paper, or notes used in connection with the preparation of such documents, is specifically forbidden. There shall be one specially designated employee in every organizational unit (or more, in larger units), of the Central Office of the Ministry, and its posts abroad, who shall collect at the end of each day all the discarded material having connection with the secret and confidential papers. The material thus collected shall be burned each day by said special employees (in the furnaces of the Central Office); Offices abroad shall use such means of burning said waste papers, as will be determined by the chief of the individual Office, depending on the local conditions.

6. (1) All secret and confidential papers marked for courier mail delivery, shall be contained in one envelope stamped "Secret," or "Confidential."

(2) Secret and confidential papers sent outside by ordinary mail, or by messengers, shall be put in two envelopes. The inside envelope sealed and stamped "Secret" or "Confidential." The outside envelope shall bear no marks of secrecy.

7. (1) The secret and confidential documents shall be sealed with a wax seal, or with the ink stamp, as follows:

(a) Mail sent by courier shall bear one wax seal in the center of the envelope, and one ink seal in its upper right corner, over the signature of the person sealing the envelope.

(b) Inside envelopes of correspondence sent outside, via postal service or messenger, shall bear five wax seals of the dispatching office; moreover, the contents of said envelope shall be laced together with the envelope, the ends of the lacing cord shall be fastened to the center of the envelope, with the wax seal.

(2) Care shall be taken not to injure the contents of the envelope when the wax seals are affixed thereon.

8. The secret and confidential documents circulated internally between the organizational units of the Ministry, shall be handled in sealed envelopes marked "Secret" or "Confidential," with the seal of the dispatching organizational unit impressed at the sealing point of the envelope.

9. (1) All secret and confidential papers shall be filed away in the steel, or armored cabinets exclusively, which shall be sealed at the end of each office day.

(2) The seals used for envelopes, and metal seals, shall be put away in the steel cabinets.

(3) The keeping of secret or confidential documents on the desk, with exception of those currently handled, is specifically forbidden.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw

DIRECTIVE

Regulations pertaining to the handling of secret and confidential papers, have been amended and supplemented, as follows:

1. Article 3, Section (2), has been amended to read: "The secrecy or confidentiality of a document shall be determined by the party charged with its handling; final responsibility as to its proper classification, shall rest with the party signing such a document."
2. Article 3, Section (3), after the words: "... can be declared secret," is amplified by the following sentence: "Incoming foreign language correspondence, bearing no classification, as to its secrecy or confidentiality, shall be examined by the chief of the organizational unit, or by an employee designated by him, for the purpose of determining its secret or confidential portent."
3. In Article 4, new Section is added. It is numbered (2). Sections (2), (3), (4) are changed to read (3), (4) and (5). The new Section (2) reads as follows: "The secret and confidential documents shall be kept in a light pink folder, to differentiate them from the general documents."
4. In Article 4, (presently Section (4)), after the words "... to whose custody such documents were entrusted," new sentence is added, which reads as follows: "The secret, or confidential documents sent out, or transmitted to other organizational unit, shall be addressed to the chief of that unit, and shall bear distinct indication that it is: "to be delivered in person." The chief of the organizational unit decides who of the employees in his unit shall have access to the secret and confidential documents."

5. New Section, (6) is added to Article 4. It reads as follows:
"Every employee who has read the secret or confidential document, shall note thereon the date of reading, and his, or her name."
6. In Article 5, after the words, ".... as a rule should not be typed in the general typing room," this new sentence was added:
"Upon the recommendation of the chief of the organizational unit, secret or confidential documents shall be written personally by the employee handling the matter, rather than by a typist. In cases when such confidential or secret documents must be typed, they shall be turned over to typist without the precis."
7. In Article 5 (1) following the words: "..... noted on the rough copy of the document," the remaining wording up to (2), shall be crossed out. It shall be substituted with the following: "The distribution list shall be limited to the absolute minimum, and each copy shall be individually numbered."
8. New Section, numbered (3), added to Article 5, reads as follows:
"Throwing into waste baskets of rough copies of confidential or secret documents, or of carbon paper, or notes used in connection with the preparation of such documents, is specifically forbidden. There shall be one specially designated employee in every organizational unit (or more, in larger units), of the Central Office of the Ministry, and its posts abroad, who shall collect at the end of each day all the discarded material having connection with the secret and confidential papers. The material thus collected shall be burned each day by said special employees (in the furnaces of the Central Office); Offices abroad shall use such means of burning said waste papers as will be determined by the chief of the individual office, depending on the local conditions."
9. Article 6, (2), following the words: "Secret and confidential papers sent," is amplified by the word: "outside."
10. Article 7, Section (1), letter (b), following the words: "inside envelopes of correspondence sent," is amplified by adding the word: "Outside."
11. New Article is added. It is numbered 8; the Article now bearing No. 8, will be numbered 9. The new Article 8 reads as follows:
"The secret and confidential documents circulated internally between the organizational units of the Ministry, shall be handled

in sealed envelopes marked "Secret" or "Confidential," with the seal of the dispatching organizational unit impressed at the sealing point of the envelope."

12. Article 9, Section (1), has been amended as follows: After the words "..... steel, or armored cabinets exclusively," this statement was added: "which shall be sealed at the end of each office day."
13. Article 9 was further amended by adding Section No. (3), which reads as follows: "The keeping of secret or confidential documents on the desk, with exception of those currently handled, is specifically forbidden."

DECREE

In order to prevent the spreading of information, which for the good of the People's Poland should be kept secret and, to prevent such information from penetrating to centers inimical to People's Poland, the Council of Ministers has resolved the following decree, which was duly ratified by the Council of State:

CHAPTER I

General Regulations

Article I,

- a) Secrets of the State are, all such information, documents, or objects, which by reasons of the defense, security or important economic or political interest to Poland, or the countries friendly to her, cannot be accessible to other than the exclusively authorized persons.
- b) The Council of Ministers can define in detail the extent of information, documents, or other objects which may constitute the State secrets, by adopting a resolution to that effect.

Article II,

Secrets of the Service are, such information, documents or other objects, which by reason of the good of the service, cannot be made accessible to other than the exclusively authorized persons.

CHAPTER II

Penal Regulations

Article III,

Any unauthorized person who gathers, keeps, transmits, discloses or publicizes the information, document, or other objects constituting the State secret, is subject to penalty of 10 years in prison.

a) Any functionary who in the course of his service, commits the crime, as defined in Article I, with reference to secret information, documents, or other objects, will be subject to prison penalty.

b) If the perpetrator of the crime as defined in Articles I and II, acted unintentionally, such person will be subject to prison penalty up to 3 years, or an arrest.

Article IV,

a) Any unauthorized person who gathers, keeps, transmits, discloses, or publicizes the information, documents or other objects constituting the State secrets, affecting the defense, or the security of the State, is subject to prison penalty.

b) If the crime, as defined in Article I, concerning the information, documents, or other objects, is committed by a clerk (functionary, official) having the access to such State secrets in connection with his service, such person is subject to prison penalty of not less than 3 years.

c) If the perpetrator of the crime, as defined in Articles I and II, acted unintentionally, such person shall be subject to prison penalty up to five years.

Article V,

a) Offenders against the orders issued by authorities for the protection of State secrets, shall be punishable by one year of prison, or an arrest.

b) If due to an action, as defined in Article I, State secret was disclosed, or could have been disclosed, the offender shall be subject to prison penalty up to 3 years, or an arrest.

c) If the culprit acted unintentionally in committing the offense defined in Article II, such person shall be subject to prison penalty up to 1 year, or an arrest.

d) If the crime, as defined in Articles I, II or III, is committed by an official while in the service, the court may impose a penalty half again as high as the maximum penalty provided for a given crime.

Article VI,

a) Offenses against the orders issued by authorities for the protection of State secrets affecting the defense, or the security of the State, are punishable by prison penalty up to three years, or an arrest.

b) If due to an action defined in Article I, a State secret is disclosed, or could have been disclosed, the offender shall be subject to prison penalty up to five years.

c) If the offender, as defined in Article II, acted unintentionally, such person is subject to prison sentence up to two years, or an arrest.

d) If the crime defined in Articles I, II and III, is committed by an official while in service, the court may impose a penalty half again as high as the maximum penalty provided for a given crime.

Article VII,

a) An official (clerk, functionary) who suffers the documents or other objects constituting the State secrets entrusted to him, to become lost, and if such act caused, or would have caused disclosure of the State secret, shall be subject to prison sentence of 10 years.

b) If the offender acted unintentionally, the penalty shall be up to three years in prison, or an arrest.

Article VIII,

- a) An official (clerk, functionary) who suffers the documents, or other objects constituting the State secrets affecting the defense or the security of the State to become lost, while said documents are in his custody; and if such act caused, or would have caused the disclosure of such State secret, shall be subject to a prison sentence.
- b) If the offender acted unintentionally, the prison penalty shall be up to five years.

Article IX,

- a) Any unauthorized person who transmits, divulges, or makes publicly known the secrets of the Service, shall be liable to prison penalty up to three years, or arrest up to 3 years.
- b) If the crime defined in Article I, is committed by an official (clerk, functionary) who has access to secrets of the Service by reason of his connection with it, such person is liable to prison penalty up to five years.
- c) If the offender, as defined in Article I or II, acted unintentionally he shall be subject to prison penalty up to two years.

Article X,

- a) Any official (clerk, functionary) acting against the directives issued by authorities for the protection of Service secrets, shall be subject to a penalty up to one year arrest.
- b) If due to an action, as defined in Article I, a Service secret is disclosed, or would have been disclosed, the offender shall be liable to an imprisonment up to 3 years, or an arrest up to three years.
- c) If the act, as defined in Article II, is committed unintentionally, the culprit shall be liable to an arrest up to one year.

Article XI,

In cases of a lesser import, the court may administer extraordinary mitigation of the penalty.

Article XII,

Penal liability affecting officials (clerks, functionaries) extends also to members of the collegiate bodies of publicly legal character, trade union bodies, as well as social and political organizations. This is in addition to persons mentioned in Article 292 of the Penal Code, and Article 46 of the Decree, on the particularly dangerous crimes during the period of reconstruction of the State.

CHAPTER III

Concluding provisions.

Article XIII,

- a) Proper judicial institutions to handle cases resultant from the commission of crimes, as defined in Articles III to VIII, are the Military Courts.
- b) Military Courts can impose prison sentences for terms up to 15 years.
- c) Provisions in Article 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and Article 55 of the Decree on crimes, (particularly dangerous during the period of country's reconstruction, shall be conformably applied.

Article XIV,

Proper juridical institutions to handle matters arising from crimes defined in Articles IX and X, are the Appellate Courts.

Article XV,

State supreme authorities shall issue directives to secure the protection of State secret.

Article XVI,

The force of Articles 289 of Penal Code, and 159 and 160 of Polish Army Penal Code, shall terminate, to be superseded by this

Decree, on the day when this Decree comes into force.

Article XVII,

Charged with the execution of this Decree are: president of the Council of Ministers, Chairman of the State Economic Planning Commission, and Ministers of, Public Security, National Defense, Justice and other Ministers.

Article XVIII,

This Decree comes into force after 10 days from the day of its publication.

0209

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw

(Confidential.)

- (1) To Citizen chiefs of Organizational cells of the Ministry's Central Office.
- (2) Chiefs of Poland's posts abroad.

The inspections carried out in the Central Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in some of its offices abroad, revealed several cases of laxity in the enforcement of secrecy regulations in connection with the handling of secret and confidential documents.

For an example, such cases, as keeping secret and confidential documents in the desks, sometimes even unlocked, in violation of point #9 of the promulgated regulations. Steel and armored cabinets not sealed, as required by point 4, Section 6; not every employee observed the rule of noting his, or her name, and the date, after reading the secret, or confidential paper, etc. At the same time it was noted, that offices and desks of the employees, often showed lack of sense of order and elementary personal culture.

In connection with the above, and independently of the sanctions applied to the offenders, it is hereby enjoined:

1. All chiefs of organizational cells in the Central Offices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and all chiefs of its offices abroad, are charged with personal responsibility for the strict observance of regulations pertaining to handling of secret and confidential documents, in units under their supervision.
2. All chiefs of organizational cells in the Ministry, and chiefs of its offices abroad, are bound to carry out without delay, the briefing of the personnel in their charge, at which time all shall be reminded of the far reaching political importance of the Decree covering the protection of the State and Service secrets; also to take up at that time, the matter of

handling secret and confidential papers, having in mind especially, the importance of the problems of work in the Foreign Affairs Department.

The substance of pertinent regulations shall be discussed in detail at such briefings, calling particular attention to the specific duty of keeping the secret and confidential documents in steel and armored cabinets. Other important documents should be kept under lock in file cabinets or desks, but only in cases of lack of room for them in the steel or armored cabinets. It is also necessary to discuss the matter of culture in the places of work (about the care and regard for the property of the State; keeping the files in exemplary order, office supplies, etc.). Copies of the minutes of such briefings, should be sent to the Independent Organizational Section in the Central office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

3. Chiefs of the organizational cells and chiefs of the posts abroad, shall maintain systematic control over units under their supervision, with regard to individual performances in connection with the regulations on handling secret and confidential documents. Any infractions in this connection shall be promptly reported to the Bureau of Personnel in the Central office of the Ministry. In exercising such control, attention should be given also to the neatness in places of work (see Point 2).

S. WIERBLOWSKI, Secretary General
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Copies to: Office of the Minister, Under-secretary of State,
Union of Government Workers and Secretary of the "POP."

0211

CONFIDENTIAL

Warsaw

Instructions Governing the Behavior of Personnel of the
Diplomatic Outposts in Case of Arrest, Search and Interrogation.

Diplomatic Personnel

The diplomatic personnel registered on the diplomatic list is entitled to full privileges and immunities as set forth by international law. A diplomat cannot be arrested, or searched, or interrogated as a witness.

In connection with the above principle, the following rules should be observed:

1. The arrest actually is unlawful, however, it is possible to detain a diplomat if such action is necessary for public safety or the maintenance of public order. After establishing the cause of the incident, he should be immediately released. It is obvious that a diplomat should never, through his own conduct, create such a situation.

2. It is unlawful to search diplomatic personnel or items in their possessions, either official or personal.

3. It should especially be emphasized that the privileged situation of diplomats has for its purpose not so much the creation of personal privileges as the assurance of independence from local authorities, necessary for the proper discharge of functions. A diplomat is not permitted to abuse his privileges for personal gains and thus he should be very cautious so as not to expose himself to charges of abusing these privileges. However, it is possible that the search, although illegal, leads to the acquirement of evidence of unlawful activity which consequently justifies the original unlawful act.

4. In case of arrest, search or interrogation, one should, above all, show his diplomatic credentials which should always be carried on the person, and protest against the action. If the protest is ineffective, the member of the diplomatic corps should demand that he be permitted to communicate with the one in charge of the outpost. When informing him of the action, one should do it by telephone; simultaneously, he should demand that the representatives of the authorities immediately communicate with their Ministry of Foreign Affairs to inform them that he is invoking the use of legitimate privileges and immunities. One should explain the illegality of the procedure. One should not, however, confess in the manner of an accused and should refuse to sign any submitted documents, stating that a member of the diplomatic corps is not subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities. Notwithstanding provocative misconduct of these authorities, the diplomat is obliged to retain his composure and avoid all words as well as actions not conforming with the dignity of his position.

You are not permitted to use abusive language, attempt to flee or resort to force, and one should limit himself to legitimate protests covered by the law and should conduct himself satisfactorily, which action will merit more respect.

5. The head of the diplomatic outpost, on being notified of the injustice to the person of one of his co-workers, should protest immediately to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the country in question, demanding the punishment of the guilty and complete satisfaction, which varies depending on the incident, but which always requires a public apology for the perpetrated injury and punishment of the guilty. One should also notify immediately one's Central Office of the facts, giving a report of the incident for the purpose of obtaining further instructions. If the incident has not been satisfactorily handled, it should then be submitted to the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps for his intervention in the incident. One should only do this if the head of the outpost, taking into consideration local circumstances, deems such action necessary and appropriate.

6. At no time are you permitted to give statements or explanations beyond those which concern routine matters connected with the incident. One should categorically decline making any statements of a personal and official nature.

7. If it concerns testifying in the manner of a witness or other capacity before the court, or some local authority to which the member of the diplomatic corps has been summoned to appear, one should beforehand obtain permission of the Central Office, which in certain instances may permit the member of the outpost to waive his immunity. In principle, the diplomat can be interrogated only in the office of the outpost and only by a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the country and not by a judge or police officer.

8. The living quarters of members of the diplomatic corps are immune. Therefore, one should categorically protest against any attempted search. If the local authorities do not withdraw, one should, immediately inform the head of the outpost who will take proper steps with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the country.

Non - Diplomatic Personnel

The legal situation and the rights of administrative and official employees of outposts, who are citizens of foreign countries, are not uniformly regulated. Some countries grant them the same rights as those granted diplomatic personnel, others deny these rights. In connection with the latter:

1. Those employees, not registered on the diplomatic list should, in principle, conduct themselves in a manner identical with the members of the diplomatic corps. However, if local practices or customs do not grant them privileges, they should comply with the rules set forth hereinafter:

2. They should not enter into agreements or incur obligations of such a nature which could, in the event of failure to live up to such obligations, serve as a pretext for action by local administrative and judicial authorities.

3. They should always be aware of the risk of being searched or detained by the police and for this reason, should exercise caution in connection with the performance of their functions.

4. In case of detainment, arrest or appearance at police headquarters for the purpose of being searched, they should demand that their superior be notified immediately.

5. In an attempted search, if there are on the person official documents, notes, or some other materials connected with their work, they should immediately advise the representatives of the local authorities about the nature of these documents and refuse consent to be searched, demand the presence of the proper member of the diplomatic outpost, who, on his arrival, will confirm the official nature of the documents. You are also not permitted to consent to the search of private documents until the representative of the outpost arrives. A representative, who is to take care of such matters, should be appointed permanently by the head of the outpost. If none exists, the head of the outpost should appoint an employee for specific incidents.

6. Upon arrival of the representative of the outpost, the employee should give him an explanation of the matter, and if the local authorities continue to demand the documents or official notes, he should categorically refuse them. The representative of the outpost should, in this case, immediately communicate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the country and demand protection for the official documents.

The representative of the outpost should, moreover, secure all letters and official correspondence found in the quarters of the said employee and transfer them to the outpost headquarters.

7. In case of a trial, the employee should avoid making any statements without the presence of a representative of the diplomatic outpost. And even after his arrival and in his presence, the investigated employee should not, in any case, give information concerning matters with which he is acquainted in view of his position. He can agree to further interrogation in unofficial matters, only after the appointment of a defense attorney, and if the local laws permit, he should demand his attorney's presence at the trial.

8. In case of arrest or search of the employee, the chief of the outpost should immediately submit a protest to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the country in question asserting that the authorities should have informed him beforehand and request an explanation. He should demand the immediate release of the arrested party unless the presented evidence convinces him that the party is involved in an offense or act not connected with the execution of official duties.

9. During the period of detainment, the arrested employee is obliged to refuse to give any statements in matters connected with his official duties or give information about the office and its employees.

10. The above observations relate also to the office of Ambassador or Envoy, if it concerns Polish citizens.

Minister

S. LESZCZYCKI

0215




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15A10TC

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Los Angeles, California
August 18, 1972



(S)

The records of the Security Office, McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Company, 5301 Bolsa Avenue, Huntington Beach, California, contained seven handprinted or typed letters addressed to and received by that company from Poland during the period of April 1972 to July 1972.

b1



(S)

The original letters were forwarded to the FBI, Los Angeles, California, by McDonnell Douglas and copies of these letters and envelopes are shown below:

5/2/03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267/MS/SBZ
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1/6
80/1257 as amended

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

0253

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MC DONNELL-DOUGLAS
AIRCRAFT CORPORATION
3855 LAKEWOOD BOULEVARD
LONG BEACH 12A-54
CALIFORNIA 90801
USA

IF UNDELIVERED PLEASE RETURN
TO SENDER :

b6

b7C

0254

FOLIANO

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4th September 1971.

Smolensk 48/2

Tel. 218-30

POLAND

DEAR SIR,

FOR LONG TIME I WANTED
TO WRITE LETTER TO YOU BUT ONLY
NOW I SEEN YOUR ADDRESS.

SO I WRITE THIS LETTER & HOPE
YOU WILL AWARD WITH ME BY YOUR
REPLY.

I AM 24 & AM STUDENT ON HIGH
ENGINEERING SCHOOL (Technical
College) ON AIRCRAFTS FACULTY.

SO I AM MOST INTERESTED IN ALL
AMERICAN PARTICULARLY AIRCRAFTS.

I AM ALSO "MODELS" (scaled down)
KEN BUILDER. BUT I CAN'T
BUY HERE ANY LITERATURE, PLANS
ABOUT YOUR AIRCRAFTS, SO
I WRITE DIRECT TO YOU.

I ASK YOU TO SEND ME
CATALOGUES, LEAFLETS, PHOTOS,
PLANS - DRAWINGS (FOR MODELS BUILDING)
TC BROCHURES ETC ABOUT
THESE DOUGLAS.

0255

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 1) Douglas "Devastator" (TBD-1) 1937
- 2) DOUGLAS "BOSTON" Bomber
- 3) DOUGLAS "DAUNTLESS"
- 4) DOUGLAS "INVADER"
- 5) DOUGLAS "XB-42"
- 6) DOUGLAS DC-7 "GLOBEMASTER" T-612
- 7) DOUGLAS "SKYRAIDER"

continued →

0256

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~~SECRET~~

- 8) DOUGLAS "SKYROCKET"
- 9) DOUGLAS X-3 experimental
- 10) DOUGLAS F-411-1 "SKYRAY"
- 11) DOUGLAS "SKYHAWK" A-4D
- 12) DOUGLAS "SKYLANCER" F-5D-1
- 13) DOUGLAS C-133A
- 14) DOUGLAS X-12 experimental
- 15) MC-DONNELL F-101 "VOODOO", RF-101A
- 16) DOUGLAS B-66 bomber
- 17) DOUGLAS C-133
- 18) MC DONNELL "Demon" F3H-2
- 19) DOUGLAS F4D-1 "SKYRAY"
- 20) MC DONNELL DOUGLAS "PHANTOM"
& IT'S VARIANTS.
- 21) ANY NEW, LATEST DOUGLAS OR
MC-DONNELL AIRCRAFTS PARTICULAR
IF YOU HAVE "variable geometry
of wings" & VTOL.

AT LAST I ASK YOU MOST KINDLY
= YOU COULD SEND ME SOME SPARE
NOT USEFULL (THOSE YOU DON'T NEED)
COPIES OF ANY AMERICAN OR ENGLISH
MAGAZINES ABOUT AIRCRAFTS PARTICULAR
"AIR PROGRESS", "FLIGHT", "JANE'S" ETC.
CAN'T BUY THEM & AS WE ARE
FORBIDDEN (NOT ALLOWED) BY RULES TO

0257

5 ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

END MONEY TO WEST - I CAN'T BUY ANY
SUBSCRIPTION.

UNDER SEPARATE PARCEL, COVER
SEND YOU SOME BOOKS WHICH
ARE ISSUED HERE ABOUT Douglas DC-3.
YOU WANT I CAN ALSO SEND YOU
PHOTOS OF DC-3 IN OUR MUSEUM.

Hope to hear soon

Best wishes from McDermel Douglas Enthusiast


b6

b7C

0258

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



THIS IS WHAT I MEAN BY
"PLANS" - BUT I NEED MORE
EXACT - PRECISION DRAWINGS TO
BUILD GOOD MODELS

0259

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

4465-

DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT CO. INCORPORATION,

3000 OCEAN PARK BOULEVARD

SANTA MONICA
CALIFORNIA 90406

U.S.A



NAD:



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KRAKOW, POLAND

0260

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KRAKON 3-05-72

DEAR FRIENDS,
I'M 16 YEARS OLD BOY. I LIVE IN POLAND.
I'M INTERESTED IN AIRCRAFT AND ITS
PROBLEMS. I KNOW THAT YOU ARE FAMOUS
AND BIGGEST FIRM ON THE WORLD.
I KNOW SOMETHING ABOUT YOUR PRODUCTS
BUT I SUPPOSE I KNOW NOT ALL.
AS I KNOW YOU ARE GOOD AT WAR-AIR-
CRAFTS AND PA PASSENGER ONES. I KNOW
YOUR VERY GOOD "SKYHAWKS" "SKYRAYS"
AND FAMOUS SERIES OF "DC". "JAKOTA-
-DC-3", DC-4 "SKYMASTER", DC-6, DC-7, DC-8,
DC-8 SUPER GA, DC-9, DC-10. IT'S FAMOUS
AND MAGNIFICENT AIRCRAFTS. I'LL VERY GLAD
IF YOU SEND ME ALL YOUR LATEST PRODUCTS
BROCHURES AND CATALOGUES, OF YOUR AND
WRITE ME SOMETHING ABOUT YOUR


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PRODUCTION , NEW MODELS, TROUBLES AND
PLEASURES AND SO ON...


YOUR~~S~~ SINCERLY



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KRAKOW , POLAND




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U.S.A.



MC - DONNEL - DOUGLAS
AIRCRAFTS FACTORY
Public Relation Office Company
BOX 68
LAKEWOOD, CALIFORNIA 90712


U.S.A.

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MR.



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POLAND

27TH September 1971.

DEAR MENAGER,

For many years I am
Keen enthusiast & fan of Duglens
& Mc Donnell Aircrafts.

I take now opportunity as I see
our address for the first time to write
to you and ask you most kindly
for help.

I am most interested in your aircrafts
but unfortunately it's near impossible
to obtain any literature about your
constructions.

0264

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So I ask to send me:
Catalogs, photographs, brochures, books
and booklets, etc advertising literature
& what is most important for me as
I am keen models builder - drawings =
= plans (side view, top & bottom views,
front & rear view + cross sections) of:
Douglas X-12, ~~B-12~~ Douglas X-3,
Douglas "Skylancer", "Skyray", "Skyhawk",
Douglas B-66, Douglas Globemaster, Galo,
Douglas "Skyshark" and "Skyrocket",
Douglas "Skystreak" and "Skyknight" →
TURN!

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Douglas "Skyraider", Douglas XB-42,
Douglas Invader, Douglas Devastator,
Douglas Skymaster, BOSTON
and : MC Donnell Voodoo ,
PHANTOM , F-15 , and SST
(if you make competition to Lockheed
and Boeing).

And I have one more
big ask to you.

Due to Rules existing here
(LAW) we are not allowed to send
money to West. So I can't buy
any subscription of any American
or European magazines about aircrafts.
But may be you could send me

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Some old copies if you have
not usefull for you - specially
"Air progress", "Joine's All THE WORLD"
ok, ok.

I hope you will be so
kind to help me & reply
my letter.

Yours big enthusiast

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
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

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Koncern Mc Donnell-Douglas
Santa Monica

U S A




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P O L A N D

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Polska

Dear Sir

I live in Zakopane the famous wintersport town
in Poland.

I was told, that you have and send very nice labels.

I am labels-collector and I shall be very happy,

if you would be so kind to send me some of your labels.

I shall stick them on my bicycle and put them in my album.

I am sending you my best greetings.



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
DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT COMPANY

SANTA MONICA

CALIF

Urząd pocztowy - Bureau de destination

U.S.A.



Nadawca
Expéditeur

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POLAND



P. P. T. 11 (X. 70) 500 000 kraj S. Mieloch

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My address



POLAND

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5.06.72.

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
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Directory Establishment
Douglas Aircraft Co.

Please send me on my address some plans, sketches and
photographs of aeroplane and cabin type DOUGLAS DC-5,
DOUGLAS TBD-1, DOUGLAS AD-4 Skyraider.

I will do an aeroplane's model for Polish Games.

I will hope that you will settle my petition.




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



DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT
DIVISION

3855 Lakewood Boulevard

LONG BEACH

U.S.A.



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POLAND

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
KATOWICE 74.001471

DEAR SIRS!

I'am very much interested in your firm.
Kindly send me please: catalogs, lablals,
leaflets, informations and badges
about your firm.

Thank you in anticipation


Yours sincerely



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My adress:

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

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Aircraft Firm Douglas
Santa Monica
California
U.S.A.

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Poland, Pologne
Polegne

Polska

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Wroctaw 16 IV 1912

Aircraft Firm Douglas

Santa Monica

California

I am Pole. My name

I am eleven years old. I collect
the postcard and prospect. I
am very want have a postcards
and prospect of aircraft Douglas.
I very ask.

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My adress:

Poland

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EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b) (1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
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- (b) (4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b) (5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b) (6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b) (7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b) (8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b) (9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d) (5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
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- (k) (3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k) (4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k) (5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
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- (k) (7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

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EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

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- (k) (5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k) (6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k) (7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

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- (b) (4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
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- (b) (8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
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SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d) (5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
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- (b) (6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b) (7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b) (8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b) (9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d) (5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j) (2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k) (1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k) (2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k) (3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k) (4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k) (5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k) (6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k) (7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b) (1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
- (b) (2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b) (3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b) (4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b) (5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b) (6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b) (7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b) (8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b) (9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d) (5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j) (2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k) (1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
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- (k) (3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
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- (k) (5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k) (6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k) (7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Case Control No. 200300133

Mr. John Young
Cryptome.org
251 W. 89th St., Suite 6E
New York, NY 10024


ROUTED
11/27/02

Dear ^{Mr.}_^ Young:

I refer to your letter to the Defense Intelligence Agency dated December 12, 2002, requesting the release of certain material under the Freedom of Information Act (Title 5 USC Section 552). In processing your request the DIA found the enclosed Department of State documents and referred them to us for our concurrence in their release.

After reviewing the documents, we have determined that they may be released.

Sincerely,


Margaret P. Grafeld
Director

Office of IRM Programs and Services

Enclosures:
As stated.

21. I am submitting the following documents in support of and as part of my application:

☒ Świadectwo urodzenia (Birth certificate)

☐ Świadectwo małżeństwa (Marriage certificate)

☐ Inne (specify attach) (Other (specify))

☐ Książeczka wojskowa (Military record)

☒ Papiery gwarancyjne lub stwierdzenia o własne źródło dochodów (Evidence of support or own resources)

☐ Obiecnicy zatrudnienia w Stanach Zjednoczonych (Promise of employment)

☒ Świadectwo(-e) lekarskie (Medical record(s))

COURT RECORDS.

VISA PETITION, DIV, DECREE, MARR, CERT, SEL, SERVICE,

22. Imię i nazwisko oraz obecne miejsce zamieszkania mojej żony (mojego męża) (Podaj nazwisko panieńskie żony)
Name and present residence of my wife/husband is (Give maiden name of wife)

1-st wife Zofia nee KUCHLEWSKI- d e c e a s e d 1954

2-nd wife Zofia nee GIBKA marr. 1955, address see item 18(a)(b)

23. Imiona i nazwiska oraz adresy moich dzieci poniżej lat 21
The names and addresses of my children under 21 years of age are

n o n e

24. Imiona i nazwiska członków mojej rodziny imigrujących razem ze mną
The names of members of my family who are immigrating with me are

n o b o d y

25. Imię i nazwisko oraz adres mojego ojca (Jeżeli nie żyje, podaj datę zgonu)
The name and address of my father is (If deceased, giving date)

Władysław SMOLA, Lubako-Krakowski Przedmieście, prov, Zielona Gora, POLAND

26. Imię i nazwisko panieńskie oraz adres mojej matki (Jeżeli nie żyje, podaj datę zgonu)
The maiden name and address of my mother is (If deceased, giving date)

Bronisława nee GRUNFELD- d e c e a s e d 1947

27. Imię, nazwisko i adres mojego najbliższego krewnego w kraju
The name and address of my next of kin in my home country is

Father see item 25

28. Wszystkie miejsca zamieszkania podawasz od skończenia 16 lat życia, jeżeli pobyt trwał 6 miesięcy lub dłużej
Since my sixteenth birthday my places of residence for 6 months or more have been

Wiosło lub miasto City or town	Powiat County	Województwo Province	Kraj Country	Data (Od-Do) Date (From-To)	Zajęcie lub zawód Calling or occupation
Czestochowa		Katowice	POLAND	1966 to present	auto-mechanic
1 m p r i s o n			POLAND	1958 to 1966 (December)	
Hann		Frankfurt	GERMANY	1957 to 1958	auto-mechanic
Zgierz		Lodz	POLAND	1952 to 1957	auto-mechanic
Lubsko	Krosno	Zielona Gora	POLAND	1945 to 1952	auto-mechanic
Biedarf	Halle	Eisenbach	GERMANY	1944 to 1945	auto-mechanic
Tarnow		Krakow	POLAND	birth 1911	auto-mechanic

29. Od skończenia 16 roku życia (zatem lub byłem/am) członkiem lub sympatykiem następujących organizacji politycznych, zawodowych, związkowych lub społecznych (nie należy pisać „nie dotyczy”)
Since my sixteenth birthday I am or have been a member or affiliate of the following political, professional, vocational or social organizations (do not write „not applicable”)

Nazwa i adres organizacji Name and address	Data (Od-Do) Date (From-To)	Rodzaj przynależności i pełniona funkcja Type of membership and office held, if any
N O N E		

30. Znam w słowie i piśmie następujące języki (Podaj także język ojczysty)
I speak, read, write the following languages (Include your native language)

Język Language	Mówię Speak	Czytam Read	Piszę Write
Polish	Polish	Polish	Polish
German	German	German	German
English		English	English

31. Byłem(-am) poprzednio w Stanach Zjednoczonych w następujących okresach czasu (Podaj rok, rodzaj wizy i rodzaj pobytu) (Jeżeli Pan(i) nie była nigdy, należy także zaznaczyć)
I have previously been in the United States during the following periods (Give year and type of visa or status) (If never, so state)

N E V E R

32. Prawne przepisy imigracyjne Stanów Zjednoczonych wymagają od przyszłych imigrantów odpowiedź na niżej wymienione pytania. Nie oznacza to jednak, że istnieje podejrzenie, że Pan(i) należy do jakiegokolwiek z grup objętych tymi pytaniami. Odpowiedzi Pana(i) powinny być jedynie konsultacją do ustalenia Pana(i) uprawnienia do otrzymania wizy. Jeżeli nie jest Pan(i) w stanie odpowiedzieć na któreś z pytań, należy podać powód zastrzeżenia się od odpowiedzi. Wyświadczenie takie należy przedstawić na osobnym arkuszu i dołączyć do oficjalnego formularza. Odpowiedzi Pana(i) — bez względu na ich rodzaj — nie będą miały decydującego wpływu na odmowę załatwienia Pana(i) podania o wizę. Na przykład, w przypadku, gdy Pan(i) uczestniczył(-a) lub skazywany(-a) za molestację wyroczym, w kronice będzie miał(-a) notację ustalenia, że tego rodzaju wyroczym było w rzeczywistości drobny przewinienie, uczestnictwo lub skazanie Pana(i) nie musi decydować o odmowie załatwienia Pana(i) sprawy.
Wskazując odpowiedzi na następujące pytania należy pisać: „nie” lub „nie”.

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WIF
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RELEASE

Translated from Polish

File 30.65/59.-

- S e n t e n c e -

in the Name of the Peoples Republic of Poland

- Warsaw, Feb.17,1959 -

The Court of the Warsaw's Military District, present:

Chairman: Teofil Lesko, cpt.

May Members: Jan Putkowski, lieut.second

Romuald Ostrowski, lieut.second

with military prosecutor Czeslaw Broka, mjr.attending,
in the presence of officially appointed ~~prosecutor~~ defense Jan Hryckowiak, and with recorder Karolina Kwiatkowska, secretary, heard the case of:

civilian Roman S m o l a, son of Wladyslaw and Bronislawa nee Grunfeld, born on Oct.2,1927 at Tarnow, of Polish origin and citizenship, married, having no children, education: 7 grades primary school and 3-year course Trade School, occupation- automobile mechanic, owning net property, of laborers' provenance, usual residence 55 Erthbergerstrasse, Hanau, German Federal Republic, served not in the /Polish/ army, but having served in 1945 in the German army, having not distinctions, sentenced by the Town Court of Krosno Carzanskie on Nov.12,1949 under art.257 para 1 of the PC to 1/one/ year and 3/three/ months imprisonment, belonging not to the party, - against whom there is a charge under art.7 of the MKK /Kaly Kodeks Karny-Little P.C.-for special cases/.

On ground of explanations given by the accused, depositions of witnesses, collected documents and evidence, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court established the following:

In summer 1957 the accused ~~Wlad~~ Roman Smola got the necessary documents and the passport for a trip to the German Democr. Republic with his wife together. He was intended to go to

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Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
() Release () Excise () Deny () Declassify
Date 3/7/3 Exemption
P. V. Allen

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intended for visiting his sister Anna Zimmerman. The accused left on Aug. 21, 1957, and after some days his sister Maria Suszek followed him.

During his stay at his sister Mrs. Zimmerman, he expressed the wish to escape to the GFR.

On Oct. 12, 1957 the accused with his wife and sister Maria Suszek together passed to Berlin. Here, with the intention to succeed in his plan, he left his luggage to his sister, and passed with his wife to West Berlin, where he asked for asylum, and was lodged at a D.P. camp.

During his stay at this camp at the time from 12 to 18 October 1957, the accused was submitted to an interrogation at the Clayallee, and in the vicinity of the Olympic Stadium by agents of the American and British secret service about his personal data, family status, the way he came to West Berlin, problems of places of employment, where the accused was appointed in Poland, dislocation of military units at Zgierz, army airports and aircrafts. The accused gave to the secret service agents detailed information, except information about airports and radar stations. As concerns the dislocation of military units at Zgierz, he said at which streets they were located.

On Oct. 18, 1957 the accused with his wife together was directed to the building situated at 115 Kurfürstendamm at West Berlin, where he lived up to Nov. 1957, and then he was transported to Frankfurt on Main, and afterwards to the DP camp called "Valka" near Nürnberg.

In this camp the accused remained up to 10th or 11th December 1957, and was again interrogated by the American and German secret service, with analogical questions as that in West Berlin. Later the accused was at the camp at Zirndorf near Nürnberg, where he worked as automobile mechanic, at the repair shop of the American Army, Würth, Germany, near Zirndorf.

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In January 1958 the accused became acquainted with two agents of the American secret service, named Dudek and Sekana. At the first meetings they presented themselves

as members of charitable organizations, and proposed to help him in his steps, he made for getting a permit to enter the United States, where lived his uncle.

During the following meetings Dudek and Sekuna informed the accused that they were agents of the American secret service, and proposed him a cooperation with the secret service; the accused accepted this proposal in April 1958. In this connection the accused signed an obligation to return by illegal way to Poland, for recruiting for espionage his brother-in-law Franciszek Suszek, residing at Lubsk. The accused was then transported to Hanau, 35 Ertzbergerstr., where he lived with his wife.

During April and May 1958 the accused underwent under the direction of Dudek a training in espionage, especially as concerns the passing of the frontier, and means of recruitment of new agents for espionage.

After having passed the training in espionage the accused was transported by a plane again to West-Berlin, where he was submitted to a supplementary trainingⁱⁿ in espionage by an agent of the American secret service named Taller concerning means for passing the frontier, and he ~~was~~ received the order to enter in contact with this agent after his returning back from Poland, what was planned for the beginning of June 1958. The accused received false^{German} documents issued to the name of Jozef Stark, and Polish documents to the name Marian Stopczyk, and after having met his guide, he betook himself in the direction of the Polish frontier. The task of the accused was to go to Poland and to recruit for espionage his brother-in-law Franciszek Suszek, to let him sign an obligation about his cooperation, and to buy three new badges of military formations and service badges/

On May 29, 1958 at about 1 o'clock the accused was arrested at the frontier zone by the frontier police of the German Democr. Rep., and on July 18, 1958 transmitted to Polish authorities.

The accused avowed in law suit that he revealed information about military units at Zgierz, known to him, and that he agreed to cooperate with the American secret service, and in result of this he undertook the obligation to return in an illegal manner to Poland, and to recruit for cooperation Franciszek Suszek, and to buy several badges of army formations.

The accused added that when leaving to Poland in May 1958 he had the intention, after having passed the frontier, to present himself at the Polish authorities, and to report about his activities, and therefore he found it useful to let the frontier service of the G.D.R. to arrest him, in spite of the order given by his guide to accelerate the crossing of the frontier. The accused explained that he does not gave detailed information to the American secret service about the location of military units at Zgierz; and that he agreed to cooperate in espionage because of difficult financial conditions into which he fell in Germany.

On ground of deposition of witnesses Maksimilian Wojciechowski and Antoni Ziolkowski, who were at the same camps in the Germ. Fed. Rep., as the accused, it results that agents of the American, British and German secret service interrogated persons living in that camps, trying to get from them interesting information. The witness Wojciechowski said that he met the accused end 1957 at one of these camps, and that the accused was interested in the possibility to return to Poland.

From the seized documents at the moment when the accused was arrested /card 115, 117 and 119, vol. 1st/ it results that the accused was arrested in the course of carrying out his task of spy.

From letters written by the accused to Wladyslaw Smola of May 4, 1958 /card 154-II/ and to Izabela Klempka of July 14, 1957 /card 159-I/ it results that he had the intention to escape to the G.F.R. much earlier, as he reported it

to the Court, saying that this occurred suddenly on Oct. 12, 1957 during his visit at West Berlin.

The accused changed in law suit his explanations given in inquiry/Card 24j-II/, stating that he does not cited the names of streets, where military units were located at Zgierz, explaining that such discrepancy occurred because he was tired in inquiry. The Court found that this statement was made by the accused with the intention to diminish his guilt, as it is logical that anyone who is tired, omits some details, but it seems not probable that he omits such details which really do not occurred, therefore the Court accepted as trustworthy that information which was given on card 24j-II in inquiry.

As it results from the official writ of the Armed Forces Staff no 0116j/I of Oct. 27, 1958, information given to a foreign secret service about location of military units at Zgierz is qualified as a revealment of military secrets. The accused who was interrogated at camps at the German Fed. Rep. was aware that he gives such information to agents of a foreign secret service.

The accused inspite of explanations given in inquiry, reported in law suit a circumstance till now not mentioned, namely that although he signed the obligation to cooperate with the American secret service, he was not intended to put into effect such obligation, because he wished, instead to go to Poland, to remain for a certain time at his sister in the Germ. Dem. Rep., but this became impossible because of the presence of the guide attached to him in West Berlin. All the explanations given by the accused do not blot-out his penal responsibility, because his agreement to cooperate with the American secret service, and steps made by him in order to put into effect this cooperation give the proof of his real criminal activity.

Witnesses Gibek and Suszek, relatives of the accused, revealed nothing directly about his activity, as their depositions related to their correspondence with the accused only.

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In the light of the above said facts the guilt of the accused is without doubt, and taking into account the facts that he revealed to foreign secret service information about the army, that he agreed to recruit for cooperation with the American secret service a new agent, and the integrity of his action to the damage of the Polish state, fully qualifies his deeds under art.7 of the MKK

While pronouncing the penalty the Court took into account the intensity of the evil will of the accused and the fact that he got money for his activity, and as extenuating circumstances - the weak condition of his health and the fact that he partly avowed his guilt.

Accordingly the Court governed by the regulations of art.art 244, 249 and 251 of the Code of Milit. Penal Proc.

p r o n o u n c e d:

the wiv. Roman S m o l a is guilty that at the time from Oct.12th to 18th 1957 and in Nov.1957 at West Berlin and the "Valk" camp he revealed to agents of the American, British and German secret service information about location of military units at Egierz, and in Apr.1958 at Zirn-dorf near Nürnberg, he agreed and signed the obligation to cooperate in espionage and committed himself to go by illegal way to Poland and to recruit for cooperation in espionage Franciszek Suszek, and to bring new badges of the Polish army, and as he was in the course to complete his task, he was arrested on May 29, - that is he committed an offence under art.7 of the MKK

and for this sentenced him

pursuant to art.7 of the MKK with the application of art. 49 para 2 of the MKK.

to 7/seven/ years and 6/six/ months imprisonment and to deprivation of public and citizen honor rights for a period of two years.

* 1196

Pursuant to art. 9 of the Pol. Army PC towards the above
said penalty is count to the sentenced the time of his
arrest prior to trial , that is from May 29, 1958.

Material evidence, that is letters, documents are to be
kept at the file of this case, and objects of personal
use cited in item 6, are to be returned to the sentenced.

The Chairman : signed Lesko opt.

Lay Members: signed Putkowski, lieut. sec.

signed Ostrowski, lieut. sec.

Rw. 5/59-

The Supreme Court Martial , Apr. 15, 1959

d e c i d e d :

to leave without reconsideration the appeal made by the
lawyer from the sentence of the Court of the Warsaw's
Military District , and to maintain the said sentence in
force.

The sentence becomes final on April 15, 1959.


Warsaw, May 4, 1959. The Chairman : signed Lesko, opt.

A true copy: A illegible. Official seal of the Court of
the Warsaw's Military District.

rec. no:

2102/67

I the undersigned Elzbieta Wielowieyska,
a duly commissioned sworn translator for
and in the City of Warsaw, do hereby certify
that the above is a true version of the
document in Polish presented to me on the
2nd day of August, 1967. -Charged 21. -



Carul

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA		PORT <input type="checkbox"/> REFERRED TO DEPARTMENT FOR ACTION PASSPORT NUMBER _____ REGISTRATION NO. _____ DATE _____ DATE _____ EXPIRES _____ EXPIRES _____ CARD (CERT.) OF IDENT. & REG. <input type="checkbox"/> \$1 APPLICATION FEE COLLECTED NO. _____ DATE _____ <input type="checkbox"/> \$5 FEE COLLECTED <input type="checkbox"/> \$1 FEE COLLECTED (FOR CARD OR CERT.) <input type="checkbox"/> NO FEE PASSPORT									
APPLICATION FOR <input type="checkbox"/> PASSPORT <input type="checkbox"/> REGISTRATION											
PART I: TO BE COMPLETED BY ALL APPLICANTS <small>(Please print name in full. Strike out item in parentheses which does not apply.)</small> <small>(First name) (Middle name) (Last name)</small> Stella Ostrowska nee Roman, a citizen of the United States, do hereby apply for (a passport) (registration).											
DESCRIPTION OF APPLICANT DATE OF BIRTH (MONTH) (DAY) (YEAR) Jan. 20, 1912 PLACE OF BIRTH Bridgeport, Conn. HEIGHT 5 FT. 7 IN. HAIR blond EYES blue VISIBLE DISTINGUISHING MARKS none		MY LAST PASSPORT WAS OBTAINED FROM: <small>(Name. If included in another's passport, state name of bearer)</small> LOCATION OF ISSUING OFFICE _____ DATE OF ISSUANCE _____ NUMBER _____ <input type="checkbox"/> SUBMITTED HEREWITH <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER DISPOSITION (STATE) _____ MY LAST REGISTRATION AS A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES WAS APPROVED									
OCCUPATION nurse NOW RESIDING AT Warszawa, ul. Kruczkowskiego 3 m 24a PERMANENT RESIDENCE (Street address, City, State) (If same as above, write "Same") same COUNTY OF RESIDENCE _____		LOCATION OF REGISTERING OFFICE _____ DATE OF REGISTRATION _____									
IN THE EVENT OF DEATH OR ACCIDENT NOTIFY (Name in Full, Relationship, Street address, City, State) Mr. Alfons Jozef Ostrowski - husband - Warszawa, ul. Kruczkowskiego 3 m 24a HAVE YOU EVER BEEN REFUSED A PASSPORT OR REGISTRATION AS A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES? IF THE ANSWER IS YES, EXPLAIN WHEN AND WHY NO											
PERSONS TO BE INCLUDED IN (PASSPORT) (REGISTRATION) <small>(This section to be completed if wife or husband is to be included. Include photographs (fluoresce in group photo).)</small>											
(WIFE'S) (HUSBAND'S) FULL LEGAL NAME _____ (WIFE'S) (HUSBAND'S) LAST U.S. PASSPORT WAS OBTAINED FROM: LOCATION OF ISSUING OFFICE _____ DATE OF ISSUANCE _____ NUMBER _____ <input type="checkbox"/> SUBMITTED HEREWITH <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER DISPOSITION (STATE) _____											
<small>(This section to be completed if children are to be included. Include photographs (fluoresce in group photo).)</small> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 30%;">NAME IN FULL</td> <td style="width: 20%;">PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, STATE)</td> <td style="width: 20%;">DATE OF BIRTH</td> <td style="width: 30%;">RESIDED IN U.S. FROM TO</td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>				NAME IN FULL	PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, STATE)	DATE OF BIRTH	RESIDED IN U.S. FROM TO				
NAME IN FULL	PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, STATE)	DATE OF BIRTH	RESIDED IN U.S. FROM TO								

FORM PS-176
7-52

If additional space is needed for any item a supplemental sheet should be used and attached.

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FORM FS 176 7-64

(PART I - Continued)

PAGE 2

FATHER'S NAME Franciszek Roman		FATHER'S PLACE OF BIRTH Poland		<input type="checkbox"/> U.S. CITIZEN <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NOT U.S. CITIZEN
FATHER'S DATE OF BIRTH 1885		<input type="checkbox"/> FATHER DECEASED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FATHER RESIDING AT Borkowo, Poland	FATHER RESIDED IN U.S. FROM unknown TO 1914	
MOTHER'S MAIDEN NAME Genowefa Kuskowska		MOTHER'S PLACE OF BIRTH Borkowo, Poland		<input type="checkbox"/> U.S. CITIZEN <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NOT U.S. CITIZEN
MOTHER'S DATE OF BIRTH 1891		<input type="checkbox"/> MOTHER DECEASED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MOTHER RESIDING AT Borkowo, Poland	MOTHER RESIDED IN U.S. FROM unknown TO 1914	
<input type="checkbox"/> I WAS NEVER MARRIED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> I WAS LAST MARRIED ON Aug. 1, 1943		DATE OF MARRIAGE PRESENT FULL LEGAL NAME OF HUSBAND OR WIFE Alfons-Jozef Wstromski		
HUSBAND'S OR WIFE'S PLACE OF BIRTH Warszawa, Poland		HUSBAND'S OR WIFE'S DATE OF BIRTH 1903		
<input type="checkbox"/> HUSBAND OR WIFE IS U.S. CITIZEN <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HUSBAND OR WIFE IS NOT U.S. CITIZEN		HUSBAND OR WIFE NOW RESIDING AT Warszawa, ul. Kruczkowskiego 3 m 24a		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MARRIAGE NOT TERMINATED <input type="checkbox"/> MARRIAGE TERMINATED BY (DEATH) (DIVORCE) ON _____ DATE _____				
PROPOSED TRAVEL PLANS				
I INTEND TO RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES PERMANENTLY TO RESIDE WITHIN _____ YEARS _____ MONTHS				
I INTEND TO CONTINUE TO RESIDE ABROAD FOR THE FOLLOWING PERIOD _____ YEARS _____ MONTHS				
(If returning to United States complete the following)				
PORT OF DEPARTURE _____				
NAME OF SHIP OR AIRLINE _____				
DATE OF DEPARTURE _____				

STAPLE ONE PHOTO HERE
DO NOT MAR FACE

The passport photographs required must be approximately 2 1/4 by 2 1/4 inches in size; be on thin unglazed paper, show full front view of applicant with a plain, light background; and have been taken within 2 years of date submitted. When dependents are included they should be shown in a group photograph with the applicant. The consular will not accept photos that are not a good likeness. Color photographs are acceptable.

Do not impress seal or staple shield photo. Attach loosely by paper clip.

I have not (and no other person included in the application has), since acquiring United States citizenship, been naturalized as a citizen of a foreign state; taken an oath or made an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state; entered or served in the armed forces of a foreign state; accepted or performed the duties of any office, post, or employment under the government of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof; voted in a political election in a foreign state or participated in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory; made a formal renunciation of nationality either in the United States or before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States; a foreign state; ever sought or claimed the benefits of the nationality of any foreign state, or been convicted by a court or court martial of competent jurisdiction of committing any act of treason against, or attempting by force to overthrow, or bearing arms against, the United States, or conspiring to overthrow, put down or to destroy by force, the Government of the United States.

(If any of the above-mentioned acts or conditions have been performed by or apply to the applicant, or to any other person to be included in the passport, the portion which applies should be struck out, and a supplementary explanatory statement under oath (or affirmation) by the person to whom the portion is applicable should be attached and made a part of this application.)

I solemnly swear (or affirm) that the statements made on all the pages of this application are true and that the photograph attached is a likeness of me and of those persons to be included in the passport.

OATH OF ALLEGIANCE

Further, I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservations, or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

1199

(To be signed by Applicant in presence of person before whom sworn)

Subscribed and sworn to (affirmed) before me this _____ day of _____, 19____

(SEAL)

Consul _____ of the United States at _____

(The Department will assume that the consular officer, forwarding the application for the Department's decision, is fully satisfied as to the applicant's identity unless a notation to the contrary appears hereunder.)

Note: False statements made knowingly and willfully in passport applications or in affidavits or other documents submitted therewith are punishable under the provisions of 18 USC 1001 and/or 18 USC 1542. 18 USC 1543 provides for a fine and/or imprisonment for a first offense and for a fine and imprisonment for a second offense.

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PART VII - ADDITIONAL STATEMENT TO BE MADE WHEN REQUIRED AS PART OF APPLICATION			
<input type="checkbox"/> To explain protracted foreign residence. <input type="checkbox"/> Citizen born in _____ and States of alien parents who is applying for the R5 _____ as for a passport or registration.			
I, <u>Stella Ostrowska nee Roman</u> , United States citizen, do solemnly swear (affirm) to the following statements:			
CEASED TO RESIDE IN THE UNITED STATES ON OR ABOUT <u>1914</u>		I DEPARTED FROM THE UNITED STATES ON (DATE) <u>1914</u>	
I DEPARTED BY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SHIP <input type="checkbox"/> AIRLINE	NAME OF SHIP OR AIRLINE COMPANY <u>unknown</u>	PLACE OF DEPARTURE <u>New York, N.Y.</u>	
I HAVE SINCE RESIDED IN THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES <u>Sept. 1939 - Nov. 1939 - Hungary</u> <u>1942-date-Poland</u> <u>Nov. 1939 - 1942 - France</u> <u>1942 - Dec. 1942 - Germany</u>		I AM NOW (PERMANENTLY) (TEMPORARILY) RESIDING IN (COUNTRY) <u>Poland</u>	
MY REASONS FOR SUCH FOREIGN RESIDENCE ARE <u>I made application for American documentation in 1946 but I could not leave Poland at that time because Polish authorities refused me an exit permit.</u>			
DATA ON BROTHERS AND SISTERS, LIVING AND DECEASED			
NAME	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	PRESENT ADDRESS	
<u>One sister and two brothers, names unknown, deceased as babies.</u>			
IF ANY BROTHERS AND/OR SISTERS HAVE APPLIED FOR A PASSPORT OR REGISTRATION, FURNISH FOLLOWING INFORMATION			
NAME	DATE OF APPLICATION	PLACE OF APPLICATION	
OTHER REFERENCES IN THE UNITED STATES			
NAME	ADDRESS		
<u>Mr. Stanislaw Zakrzewski 9 uncle) - 46 Mass. Ave. Fairfield, Conn.</u>			
SCHOOLS ATTENDED IN THE UNITED STATES			
NAME	ADDRESS	PERIOD OF ATTENDANCE	
BAPTISMAL DATA			
CHURCH	ADDRESS	DATE	
I MAINTAIN THE FOLLOWING TIES OF FAMILY, BUSINESS, AND PROPERTY WITH THE UNITED STATES <u>as a boy</u>			
I (DO) (DO NOT) PAY THE UNITED STATES INCOME TAX AT			
I HAVE (READ) (HAD READ TO ME IN THE <u>Polish</u> LANGUAGE) THE CONTENTS OF THIS APPLICATION AND I SWEAR THAT I UNDERSTAND THE STATEMENTS CONTAINED HEREIN.			
X (SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT)			
OPINION OF OFFICER TAKING APPLICATION (Use additional sheets if necessary) <u>Applicant was identified by her Polish ID card. This is her second application for registration in Poland, the first having been made at this office in 1946. She applied for permission to leave Poland at that time and was refused by the Polish authorities. She says she has voted in Poland in three elections, those of Jan. 20, 1957; Feb. 2, 1958; April 16, 1961. She says she did not vote voluntarily but because the voting authorities compelled her to vote. Also, her husband was then under arrest for a political offense and she was afraid of further trouble if she did not vote. In view of the refusal of the Polish authorities to let her leave Poland in 1946 and the subsequent arrest and imprisonment of her husband I do not consider her presence in Poland to have been voluntary and I do not hold that 349(b) is applicable. I further believe that her voting was not voluntary and therefore not expatriative. She says under oath she has performed no other expatriative acts. In the absence of indications to the contrary I recommend approval of her application subject to the concurrence of the Department.</u>			

Alfred Harding
 American Consul

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE CITIZEN IDENTIFICATION FORM			FOI 100
1. NAME AND ALIASES OSTROSKA, Stella nee RUCIN	2. DATE OF BIRTH Jan. 20, 1912	2A. PLACE OF BIRTH Bridgeport, Conn.	
3. PARENTAGE (If father born U. S. citizen state manner in which acquired, including date and place of naturalization, if naturalized, and last record of passport or related documentation, if any) No record of parents' naturalization USA			
1A. FATHER'S NAME Francisza Resided Bridgeport 1904-1912	FATHER'S BIRTHPLACE 1886 Plock, Poland		
1B. MOTHER'S NAME Genowefa KUSCZYNSKA Resided Bridgeport 1908-1912	MOTHER'S BIRTHPLACE 1882 Plock, Poland		
4. NAME OF SPOUSE Marian Slabicki, alien; married April 18, 1927 - appear to have been separated, no evidence in file.	DATE OF BIRTH August 6, 1899	PLACE OF BIRTH Przerzysl, Poland	
5A. NAMES OF CHILDREN (SCS: Andrzej Jozef	DATES OF BIRTH Feb. 7, 1944-alien Jul. 11, 1945-alien)	PLACES OF BIRTH	
6. IF NATURALIZED U. S. CITIZEN:			
A. DATE OF NATURALIZATION AND COURT		B. CERTIFICATE NO.	
7. PASSPORTS ISSUED TO OR REGISTRATIONS APPROVED FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL			
A. PLACE OF ISSUANCE OR APPROVAL Ppt. issued, Marseille did not proceed USA Reg. appl., Warsaw Filed in Dept.	B. DATE Aug. 21, 1942 Aug. 29, 1946 June 12, 1947	C. NUMBER	
7. DATE THIS CASE LAST CONSIDERED (i.e., date of most recent document on file) June 12, 1947			
8. OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (including last known place and period of foreign residence with address in foreign country and names and addresses of close relatives or interested persons in the U. S.) Resided Poland 1914-1939; France 1939; Poland since 1942 LKA-1947: Plock, Kolejowa 18, Poland Contact USA-1947: Aunt, S. Zakrzewski, 118 Mass. Ave., Fairfield, Conn. Eleonora Zakrzewska, P. O. Box 3007, Bridgeport, Conn.			
9. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS (Special factors to be considered in this case, i.e., provisions of U. S. law which provide for repatriation or facts, circumstances or legal decisions, which have prevented or combined expatriation) Embassy, Warsaw, reported Dec. 19, 1946 that she had not expatriated herself and when exit permit received endeavor would be made to repatriate under authorization Deptel 380, May 1, 1946.			
10. ADJUDICATOR'S CONCLUSION: RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DO NOT INDICATE THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL MAY STILL HAVE A VALID CLAIM TO U. S. CITIZENSHIP.			
NAME OF ADJUDICATOR <u>Elizabeth Barnes</u> <u>lr</u> DATE <u>June 13, 1957</u>			

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SEC INFORMATION

Step-son: Wladimir Ostrowski, born in 1932 in Poland.

Subject presented birth certificate issued October 25, 1937 by Bureau of Vital Statistics, Bridgeport, Conn. Stated to be dual national by Embassy.

SA SPOCK:

(2) ALFONSO OSTROWSKI 1902 Warsaw, Poland
Alien; married August 1, 1943

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TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING American Embassy Warsaw

Charge: 15

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Classification

Control: 748/258

Date: Sept 15, 1967

ACTION: SecState WASHDC PRIORITY 3611

WARSAW 748

FOR SCB

AmCit Stanislaw (Stella) OSTROWSKA, nee Roman, reports son Andrzej, Pol cit arrested Polish counterintelligence as U.S. agent. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Son left Poland three years ago, ^{and} mother did not know he was in country until informed of arrest by special military prosecutor. Her Pol cit husband now serving long sentence for unknown political crime.

2. Mrs. Ostrowska, who is dual citizen, fears arrest, but lacks funds required by Pol for Polish passport. Feels relatives would supply funds if informed of situation, but afraid to write facts in letter. Estimate funds required \$210 for passport, \$225 air passage plus U.S. passport fee and incidentals.

3. Embassy considers Mrs. Ostrowska's fears well founded, requests following action as appropriate:

a) ^{Discreetly} Contact either, Wladyslawa KARMANIAC, cousin, Fairfield, 46 Mass. Ave., Bridgeport, Connecticut, or Stanislaw ZAKRZEWSKI, uncle, same address. Inform of situation and ^{and invitation.} request financial aid/ Suggest personal rather than phone contact if possible.

b) If assistance not available, suggest prompt processing repatriation loan.

Although above information may, in Department's discretion, be given family, Embassy suggests they be cautioned against indiscriminate dissemination. ^{Publicity may harm Ostrowska.}

Drafted by:

CON: TJScanlon:rh 9/15/67

Concurrence:

CON: SAdobrenchuk

Approving Officer:

DCM: WEJenkins, Jr.

Admin: WJH

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Admin - William J. Holda

September 12, 1967

CON - Thomas J. Scanlon

Stanislawa (Stella) OSTROWSKA

On the morning of September 11, 1967, Mrs. Stanislaw (Stella) OSTROWSKA, an American citizen by birth and a dual national of Poland called at the Embassy and asked to speak privately with the Consul. Mr. Dobrenchuk and I spoke with her and passed the following information to Mr. Junewicz.

Mrs. Ostrowska's son, Andrzej Ostrowski, born February 7, 1944 in Warsaw has been arrested by Polish counterintelligence and accused of spying for the United States. She realizes that little can be done for him, but she fears for herself since she has pending an application for an American passport. A special military prosecutor called on her and interrogated her. (She did not give a name, but referred to him as "the Colonel".) She says that her son left Poland for Western Europe three years ago. He was to go to Switzerland. She had not heard from him since and did not know that he was in Poland until told of his arrest.



DOWN *[Handwritten signature]*

CON: TJ Scanlon: rh

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Date 3/7/2 Exemption _____

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But he does not say whom he has in mind. But surely it is not likely that he could mean those 15 delegates designated by the Episcopate, so whom the authorities refused to issue passports for the trip to Rome? Most probably he is thinking of representatives from the subversion campaign under the sign of "PAX" and the Christian Social Association - organizations whose common enemy to Rome is Janusz Makowski. Besides, he is not alone there; passports, - unattainable to the Episcopate's delegates - were readily issued to others. There is talking with representatives of the PAX press, from papers like *LA I PRZECI*, *WISLACZNIK LITERACKI*, or *ARGUMENTY*. Stanislaw Mazkiewicz, author of numerous articles aimed against the Priests and the Episcopate - is also among them. Is it they, in Krzyski's opinion who ought to represent the Polish Catholics?

News by Mr. J. PRACHA - The circumstances of Col Ostrowski's death

A few days ago we received information from the *Wzrost* which cast an interesting beam of light both on the scope of the ferment which came to the fore in the Polish Army in connection with the Israeli-Arab war, and the circumstances of the tragic death of Lt. Colonel and pilot Zygmunt Ostrowski.

On September 7, the *ROLNIERZ WOLNOSC* contained an obituary of pilot Col. Zygmunt Ostrowski who, it said, had died tragically on September 5. The obituary was given in behalf of the Command, the officers, men, and civilians *Pracownicy* of the Airforce Technical Institute, where Col. Ostrowski had held a responsible post.

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In the same column there appeared condolences to the family of the deceased, also on behalf of the Command, the officers, men and civilian personnel of this Institute.

Already a few days after this edition of the *WOLNIER* arrived, a growing suspicion began to develop about the death of Colonel Ostrowski. For it occurred at a time when reports kept pouring in from the Homeland about disciplinary reprisals employed by the Party leadership in the case of high-ranking officers of the Air Force who had come into conflict with the Party in connection with the events in the Middle East.

The striking thing about all this were certain ostensibly trifling but quite intriguing details.

First of all the signature of the Party Committee was lacking under the obituary announcing the death of Col. Ostrowski. A significant detail, because, as we know, Col. Ostrowski was a KPP activist and even had important Party functions.

Then, one's attention was riveted by other details. Thus, neither the obituary, nor the condolences attended through the *WOLNIER* mentioned the date of the funeral - as is customary. Also, the circumstances in which Colonel Ostrowski met his tragic death were never explained.

This mysterious death has only just become clarified, because news has been received that Col. Ostrowski committed suicide and that there was a political background to it.

The suicide of Col. Ostrowski, a high-ranking officer of the Air Force undoubtedly has a connection with the conflict and the purge which occurred in the ranks of the Polish Army, and especially in the Air Force, after the outbreak of the Middle East war. As we know, three commanders of the National Air Defence were Generals Maciejowski, Ostrowski and Stankiewicz.

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were discharged because, in keeping with their duties, they had expressed expert criticism of Soviet equipment, Soviet air defense tactics and Soviet military intelligence. Their conclusions and assessment were based on the experience of the defeat suffered by the Arabs at the hands of Israel. Many other officers, whose names we do not know, as yet, also fell victim to the purge at that time.

The suicide of Colonel Ostrowski, an Air Force officer and activist of the PZPR, took place more than 2 months after these events. It shows that despite Dragomir's reprisals, and perhaps because of them, the crisis at the top level of the Army and especially in the Airforce - still continues. And so does the deep ferment and discontentment, probably. Its cause lies in the blind and unconditional subservience of the present Party leadership to Russian interests.

There is still dead and obviously embarrassed silence about all this in the Polish press and radio. But reports, passed on in whispers in the Homeland, get across to the West sooner or later - and by a great variety of channels.

The news about Colonel Ostrowski's death was announced already on Tuesday by Radio Tirana in its Polish-language broadcasts, which serve the Stalinist faction of the PZPR as its propaganda platform. Incidentally, this provided one more tangible proof that the Polish section in Radio Tirana - (as we know, by Kasiński Eljal who lives there - is kept well-informed via the Chinese Embassy in Warsaw. In the same broadcast, Radio Tirana also reported on the retaliatory measures against pilot General Julian Pędzior who, as the Polish Stalinists maintain, has been suspended in his functions and is even said to be going on

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Furthermore, it is significant that public opinion in Poland first heard the news about Col. Gostrowski's death from a broadcast of one Radio-station, and this time also from the Polish Stalinists in Warsaw.

From Mr. A. Meyer - the statement of the Dutch CP.

The Central Committee of the CP of Holland has announced that it will not take part in the celebrations of the 30th anniversary of the Russian Revolution in Moscow.

The central mouthpiece of the Dutch Party, DE WERELD, substantiated this decision by stating that any invitation from the Kremlin is exploited by Soviet propaganda as evidence of support for Moscow's policy. As things are, DE WERELD writes: "The Dutch Communist Party considers this policy to be harmful to Socialism and has resolved to dissociate itself from it".

The communique of the Dutch CC enumerates the following abuses of Moscow which it considers deplorable. Thus, it maintains that the proposal of a conference of all Communist parties, put forward by the Soviet leaders, could only deepen the split in the international Communist movement. It maintains that Moscow's "friendly neutrality" towards the present Government in Jakarta amounts to a betrayal of the Indonesian Communists. It accuses the Soviet Government/- and I quote - "by giving its support to the trouble-making Pan-Arab chauvinism it brought about the development of Israeli policy which is inspired by the imperialism of extremists". And finally, the CC of the Dutch CP accuses the Soviet Union of collaborating with Washington in the campaign on behalf of the non-proliferation of

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PIECZARA, Marjona: IV Applicant: Request for Security Advisory Opinion

Marjona Pieczara was invited to the Embassy for an interview on December 13, 1967. The invitation was made because he had returned a form BPD-70 indicating membership in the Polish United Worker's Party (PZP) from January 17, 1963, to the present. Mr. Pieczara told the interviewing consular officer the following story.

His mother, Mrs. Janina Bieczyslaw Paluch, nee Warkasowska, formerly Pieczara, had divorced his father and on July 7, 1966 had married Mr. George Frank Paluch of 1021 North Ashland Avenue, Chicago, Ill. (Mr. George Paluch was born in Poland and naturalized an American in 1949.) Mr. Paluch then returned to the United States and filed visa petitions for Mrs. Paluch and her daughter Anna and son Lukasz. (The Embassy sent Mrs. Paluch Packet Three on November 17, 1966, and accepted formal visa applications for her and Anna on December 19, 1966. Lukasz had decided not to go to the U.S. Mrs. Paluch was informed on Dec. 22, 1966 that everything was in order except her Polish passport and that she should now apply for her passport.) In January, 1967, while the applicant was serving his compulsory military duty, he was called in by an unnamed Colonel in Polish Military Intelligence and told that his mother would not get a passport to go to the United States if he did not agree to follow and join her there as an agent of Polish Military Intelligence. He agreed to do so. His mother and sister obtained their passports and on May 18, 1967 received their immigrant visas.

In November 1967 Mrs. Paluch filed a second preference petition for her son in Chicago.

The applicant further stated that he had had about ten interviews with the above-mentioned colonel, his also unnamed successor and their deputy. His Polish intelligence contacts had assisted him in all phases of his visa application and are arranging for his passport issuance. They first considered concealing his Party membership, but they decided to reveal it since they judged we might have more way of finding out anyway.

The applicant stated that he would be given the name of his military intelligence superior in the U.S. just before he left for the United States. He stated that he had no intention of cooperating with Polish intelligence after he arrived in the United States. The consular officer asked what he would do if pressures were placed on him through his relatives (his father and brother) who are remaining in Poland. He stated that he assumed the FBI could take care of him in that case. He also suggested that he might be arrested on a false espionage charge shortly after arriving in the U.S. and then released. In this way Polish intelligence would keep away from

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P. Valdes

him. In the course of the interview he mentioned that he was now in the hands of Polish Military Intelligence, not the intelligence operation run by the Ministry of the Interior. He stated that he had no knowledge what his duties in the U.S. were supposed to be or what type of operations Polish Military Intelligence ran in the U.S. He stated that he knew only that the Russians had the primary responsibility among the Bloc Countries for military intelligence in the United States and he thought the Polish presence there was only for liaison.

Mr. Pieczara joined the PZPR in 1953 at the age of nineteen because he feared his chances of receiving an education would be jeopardized if he did not. He has not left the Party since that time for fear of the consequences. The consular officer found his membership in the PZPR involuntary within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Mr. Pieczara will not proceed with his passport application. In the opinion of the consular officer, refusing Mr. Pieczara's visa or unduly delaying the issuance after Mr. Pieczara obtains his passport would expose him to suspicion from his intelligence contacts and seriously jeopardize his security, assuming, of course, that his story is true.

The Department is requested to advise as soon as possible whether Mr. Pieczara is eligible on security grounds for the issuance of an immigrant visa.

cc: W. E. Jenkins, Jr.
W. J. Holda
E. S. Juchniewicz
✓ E. E. Metzger

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